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COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST LAW IN
CENTRAL EUROPE: POLAND, THE CZECH
REPUBLIC, SLOVAKIA, AND HUNGARY
Carolyn Brzezinski*
INTRODUCTION
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary have enacted
antimonopoly laws to stimulate and safeguard the competition necessary
for market-based economies.' Under the bold decision made by each of
these post-communist states to introduce market forces rapidly and to
transform their non-competitive socialist systems to competitive market-
based systems, competition plays a vital and unprecedented role.2 Form-
ing the principal component of the transformation process, the competi-
tion policies3 of these countries permeate all areas of economic reform:
restructuring and privatization, sustained economic growth and stability,
improved systems of production and distribution, foreign investment, and
gradual full integration with the European Union (EU).4
* Associate, White & Case, London office; J.D. University of Virginia; M.A. University
of Connecticut; B.A. University of Connecticut. Between 1991 and 1993, the author was an
associate in the Warsaw office of White & Case. She would like to thank Ewa Szymanska of
the Polish Antimonopoly Office, Ivo Bezecny of the Czech Ministry of Economic Competition,
Danica Paroulkova of the Slovak Antimonopoly Office, and Joszef Sarai of the Hungarian
Office of Economic Competition for their support and assistance in the preparation of this
article.
1. As defined by Edwin Dolan, the term "socialism" means any system in which: (i) a
major share of non-labor factors of production are owned in common by the state, and (ii)
incomes are distributed at least somewhat more equally than under classical liberal capitalism.
EDWIN G. DOLAN, BASIC MICROECONoMics 428-32 (2d ed. 1980). The term "market-based
economy" means any economic system based on private ownership of all factors of production
in which owners of capital act as entrepreneurs and coordinate their activity through use of the
market. Id. at 426-28.
2. As David Lipton and Jeffrey Sachs state, "[w]ith amazing rapidity, the post-communist
politicians of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have dropped any support for an economic
'third way' - that is, some form of market socialism - and seem intent on moving instead
to a full-fledged market economy based on private property." David Lipton & Jeffrey Sachs,
Creating a Market Economy in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, I BROOKINGS PAPERS ON
ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 75, 76 (1991).
3. As defined by Eleanor Fox and Janusz Ordover, "[c]ompetition policy is comprised of
policy, structures and incentives designed to inspire people and firms to be engaged in the
economic enterprise and to be responsive, productive and inventive." Eleanor M. Fox & Janusz
A. Ordover, Free Enterprise and Competition Policy for Central and Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union, in PRIVATISATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 85, 87 (Stephen A. Rayner
ed., 1992).
4. Founded on the European Communities (EC), the EU was established by the TREATY
ON EUROPEAN UNION art. A, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992) [hereinafter EU TREATY]. The
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Prior to the collapse of communism, the economies of Poland, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary5 were geared toward heavy
industry, were, in general, centrally planned,6 and were integrated both
horizontally and vertically.7 Most decisions regarding allocation of wages,
investment, and credit were made by the state bureaucracy pursant to a
comprehensive and binding "plan." 8 Also, as a result of the socialist
policy of mandatory full employment and insulation from international
competition, productivity in large, industrial state-owned enterprises
declined, and economic stagnation and inflation appeared.9
Recognizing the failures of their formerly non-competitive economies,
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary attach primary
importance to competition as a means of economic transformation and
growth. Accordingly, the competition authorities created under the
antimonopoly laws of the post-communist states play crucial and diverse
roles in market surveillance, demonopolization, import liberalization,
restructuring of natural monopolies, and merger control.' 0 With the
EC, which is comprised of the European Economic Community (EEC), the European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC), and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), was
established pursuant to both the TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMU-
NITY, reprinted in 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958), amended by Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L
169) 1 [hereinafter EC TREATY], and the EU Treaty. Under the EU Treaty, the EC Treaty
became the treaty establishing the European Community. EU TREATY art. G. Accordingly,
where discussed in the context of the EC Treaty, laws of the EU will be referred to as EC laws.
5. In general, the post-communist economic reform programs of Poland, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary commenced in 1990. See Eastern Europe: A Market Economy
Takes Root, Bus. WK., Apr. 15, 1991, at 46, 48.
6. In Poland and Hungary, however, the system of central planning had been gradually
replaced in the 1980s with a system of negotiation between enterprises and financial authorities
as to prices, interest rates, and taxes. Thus, although state enterprises became "self-governing"
or "autonomous," autonomy as such did not equate with either free competition or the
emergence of market-based relations among enterprises. See, e.g., Law of Sept. 25, 1981, on
Self-Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, Dziennik Ustaw [hereinafter Dz.U.] 1981 No. 24,
Item 123. For a discussion of "plan softening" during the final years of the communist era, see
Hubert Izdebski, Legal Aspects of Economic Reforms in Socialist Countries, 37 AM. J. COMP.
L. 703, 722-40 (1989).
7. As stated by Lipton & Sachs, "[t]he organization of industry was designed to facilitate
top-down planning, rather than market competition, with a heavy orientation toward large firms
integrated both horizontally and vertically." Lipton & Sachs, supra note 2, at 82.
8. Remarking on the notion of "the plan," Professor lzdebski states that
[allthough economic reforms were undertaken in particular countries in relatively
different epochs and in relatively different circumstances, their starting point was
always the same: the over-centralized system of a state planned economy, which ...
excludes substantial reform of the administrative allocation of resources and goods
as if the entire national economy were a unique enterprise.
Izdebski, supra note 6, at 704.
9. Jeffrey Sachs, Building a Market Economy in Poland, Sci. AM., March 1992, at 34, 34.
10. As a result of their diverse roles and relatively small staffs, however, the limited
resources of the competition authorities are extremely overburdened.
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exception of the Czech Ministry of Economic Competition, the competi-
tion authorities have been established at the sub-ministerial level and thus
serve as apolitical institutions capable of ensuring continuity in economic
reform during turbulent periods of political and social transition."
When the competition authorities were created, extremely high
expectations surrounded their potential impact and effectiveness in
facilitating economic transformation. Three years later, the progress and
achievements of the competition authorities may feasibly be analyzed and
assessed.' 2 For instance, are these institutions fulfilling the roles for which
they were originally created? Will these institutions be able to fulfill such
comprehensive roles with their existing resources? Finally, do these
institutions have the proper legal foundation upon which to pursue their
mandates?
This article answers each of the above questions. First, this article
briefly introduces the antimonopoly laws and competition authorities
created in the four post-communist Central European countries of Poland,
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary. 13 Second, this article outlines
the obligations and harmonization programs of the competition authorities
under the Europe Agreements' 4 recently signed by each country. 5 Third,
11. Unlike heads of agencies, ministers, as members of government, normally are replaced
following elections. Because elections have occurred frequently in the fragile post-communist
democracies, ministries have been subject to larger shifts in policy than have agencies and other
government offices.
12. As stated by Russell Pittman in 1991,
[b]oth experience and theory also suggest that understanding the text of the law itself
is only the first step in understanding how the law will affect businesses, consumers,
and society; one must also know how the law will be enforced by the 'competition
agencies and interpreted by the courts.
Russell Pittman, Some Critical Provisions in the Antimonopoly Laws of Central and Eastern
Europe, 26 INT'L LAW. 485, 485 (1992).
13. These four countries were selected for this article based on their cooperation in trade,
competition, and other matters as members of the so-called "Visegrad Quadrangle." Eugeniusz
Mozejko, Quadrangle Trade, ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE, No. 4, Jan. 24, 1993, at 23, translated in
POLISH NEWS BULL., Jan. 26, 1993.
14. Europe Agreement with Poland, 1993 O.J. (L 348) 2 [hereinafter Poland Europe
Agreement]; Europe Agreement with the Czech Republic, signed Oct. 4, 1993 (unpublished,
on file with author) [hereinafter Czech Republic Europe Agreement]; Europe Agreement with
Slovakia, signed Oct. 4, 1993 (unpublished, on file with author) [hereinafter Slovakia Europe
Agreement]; Europe Agreement with Hungary, 1993 O.J. (L 347) 2 [hereinafter Poland Europe
Agreement]. These agreements will be collectively referred to as the Europe Agreements. The
Europe Agreements between the EC and Poland and the EC and Hungary were signed at the
EC Council of Ministers in Brussels on December 16, 1991, ratified by the parliaments of each
associated country, each EC member state, and the EC, and entered into force on February 1,
1994. See Agreement with EEC To Be Signed Today, GAZETA WYBORCZA, No. 291-2, Dec.
14-16, 1991, at 3, translated in POLISH NEWS BULL., Dec. 16, 1991. The Czech Republic and
Slovakia each signed separate yet identical versions of the Europe Agreements on October 4,
1993, which are in the process of ratification. Telephone Interview with Willem Aldershoff,
Administrator, DG 1, European Commission (Dec. 20, 1993).
15. Hereinafter these countries will be referred to collectively as the "associated countries."
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this article assesses the role and importance of the antimonopoly laws and
competition authorities in the post-socialist economic reforms currently
underway. Fourth, this article describes proposals to amend the
antimonopoly laws based on the initial period of their implementation.
Finally, this article attempts to assess the post-reform role of both the
antimonopoly laws and the competition authorities.
I. OVERVIEW OF ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS
During the past four years, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and
Hungary have each enacted an antimonopoly law. 16 Similar to antitrust
law in the United States, antimonopoly law forms one of the principal
cornerstones of competition policy in post-communist countries. As the
Polish Office states, however, "the promotion and protection of competi-
tion in the process of transforming a centrally planned economy into a
market economy requires going beyond the scheme of classical antitrust
policy."' 7 These antimonopoly laws therefore are designed to create,
develop, and protect competition during the transition from a socialist to
a market-based economy.' 8 Each law establishes a competition authority
that is entrusted with development and protection of competition and
oversight and enforcement of competition law.' 9 The Polish
Antimonopoly Office, the Czech Ministry of Economic Competition, the
Slovak Antimonopoly Office, and the Hungarian Office of Economic
Competition all have similar mandates with regard to competition in the
post-socialist economies.2°
16. Polish Act of Feb. 24, 1990, on Counteracting Monopolistic Practices, Dz.U. 1991 No.
89, Item 403 [hereinafter Polish Law]; Czech and Slovak Federal Competition Protection Act
of Jan. 30, 1991, zdikon C.63/1991 Sb. [hereinafter Czech Law]; National Council of the Slovak
Republic Act of July 8, 1994, on the Protection of Economic Competition, Act No. 188/1994
Coll. of Laws [hereinafter Slovak Law]; Hungarian Act of Nov. 20, 1990, on the Prohibition
of Unfair Market Practices, No. LXXXIV, MK No. 121, Dec. 5, 1990 [hereinafter Hungarian
Law].
17. POLISH ANTIMONOPOLY OFFICE, COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY IN POLAND
(1991-1993) 7 (Jan. 1994).
18. Polish Law, supra note 16, at preamble (ensuring development of competition,
protecting economic entities from monopolistic practices, and protecting interests of consum-
ers); Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 1 (protecting economic competition against restriction,
distortion, and elimination); Slovak Law, supra note 16, at art. 1 (protecting economic
competition and creating conditions for its further development); Hungarian Law, supra note
16, at preamble (protecting freedom and fairness of competition).
19. Polish Law, supra note 16, at art. 17; Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 11; Slovak
Law, supra note 16, at art. 11; Hungarian Law, supra note 16, at arts. 52(1) and 53(t).
20. Hereinafter these authorities will be individually referred to as the Polish Office, the
Czech Ministry, the Slovak Office, and the Hungarian Office and collectively referred to as the
competition authorities. The name of the Czech Office for Economic Competition was changed
to the Czech Ministry of Economic Competition. Act of Oct. 31, 1992, Act No. 474/1992 Coll.
of Laws. In order to govern federation-wide application of the Act, the Czech Law also
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Although certain provisions reflect the influence of the laws of the
United States and individual EC member states, the dominant model upon
which the competition laws of the post-communist countries are based is
the EC model. The Czech and Slovak antimonopoly laws are both based
on the former Czech and Slovak Federal Competition Protection Act. 21
Both countries have adapted the Act to their newly independent econo-
mies: on November 11, 1993, the Czech Parliament passed amendments
to the Act proposed by the Czech Ministry,22 and on July 8, 1994, the
Slovak National Council adopted a new law modeled on the existing
Act.23 Since all of the laws were passed prior to the signing of the Europe
Agreements, they do not mirror the format or substance of EC competi-
tion law as embodied in those Agreements. 24 For purposes of comparative
analysis, however, the antimonopoly laws may be divided into provisions
focusing on monopolistic practices, abuse of a dominant or monopolistic
position, merger control, and demonopolization.25
A. Monopolistic Practices
In Central Europe,'as the private economy develops and privatization
continues to produce new commercial entities, free market business
practices are replacing former command and control practices. Given the
established a Federal Office for Economic Competition, which ceased to function upon the
dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federation. Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 10.
21. Within the legal framework of the former Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, federal
laws were enacted by the Czechoslovak Parliament, the Federal Republic's highest legislative
organ. Upon dissolution of the Federal Republic, the Czech National Council, the highest
legislative organ in the Czech Republic, enacted a so-called "Reception Law," pursuant to
which all federal laws automatically became the laws of the Czech Republic as of January 1,
1993. Czech Reception Act, Act No. 4/1993 Coll. of Laws (1993). Thus, the legal regime of
the new Czech Republic is comprised of former federal laws and any new laws passed by the
Czech Republic. Since the Slovak Parliament did not adopt a special reception law, the
transition rules are provided in Articles 152 and 153 of the Slovak Constitution, pursuant to
which laws of the federation remain valid in the Slovak Republic until they are replaced or
repealed. SLOV. REP. CONST. arts. 152 & 153.
22. Act of Nov. 11, 1993, on the Protection of Economic Competition, Acts No. 495/1992
and No. 286/1993 Coll. of Laws [hereinafter November 1993 Amendments]. The November
1993 Amendments became effective as of Jan. 1, 1994. Telephone Interview with Ivo Bezecny,
Office of the Minister, Czech Ministry of Economic Competition (Feb. 1, 1994).
23. Slovak Law, supra note 16. The National Council is the formal name of the Slovak
parliament.
24. The competition provisions of the Europe Agreements essentially comprise the EEC
TREATY arts. 85, 86, and 92.
25. The Hungarian Law also contains sections on unfair competition and consumer
protection that will not be examined in this article. However, it must be noted that the
Hungarian Law heavily emphasizes the protection of consumers. See, e.g., Hungarian Law,
supra note 16, at preamble.
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large "gaps" that exist in the commercial laws of the associated coun-
tries,26 market surveillance provides an essential check on anticompetitive
business practices. 27 Accordingly, each country has developed legal
prohibitions against anticompetitive and monopolistic practices and has
purposely constructed the laws with vague language to give the competi-
tion authorities discretion to weigh the benefits of a given economic
activity against the harm from the activity's restriction on competition.
28
The Polish Law provides an exhaustive list of practices that are
prohibited unless they are "necessary to conduct an economic activity"
and do not cause a "significant" restraint of competition.29 The prohibited
practices include imposition of onerous contract terms, tying arrange-
ments, anticompetitive share and asset acquisitions, interlocking director-
ates, price fixing, market division, restriction of market access, limitation
of production, sales or purchases, and agreements between competitors to
fix contract terms concluded with third parties. 30 The general prohibition
against all such practices applies regardless of the market share of the
entity.31
Unlike the Polish Law, the Czech Law does not provide an exhaus-
tive list of monopolistic practices. Instead, this law enumerates examples
of monopolistic agreements and practices that are unlawful if they result
26. As a result of four decades of non-use, in 1989, commercial law in the associated
countries was generally obsolete or lacking; since that time the post-communist governments'
efforts to address the need for sound commercial law have been largely interstitial. See, e.g.,
Carolyn Brzezinski, The EC-Poland Association Agreement: Harmonization of an Aspiring
State's Company Law, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 105, 115 (1993).
27. One often hears citizens of Central Europe comparing the post-socialist economies to
economies at the turn of the century or to that of the "Wild West." Innovative means of market
surveillance being used or considered by the competition authorities include a cartel register
and registration questionnaires. See, e.g., POLISH ANTIMONOPOLY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 31.
28. In the transition period when many state enterprises and fledgling new businesses fail
to survive and aggregate production continues to decline, competition authorities are naturally
wary to curb any economic initiative, believing that a strong, pro-competitive economy is
useless in the absence of economic activity. For a discussion of the vagueness of the laws, see
generally Pittman, supra note 12. Nonetheless, as stated by the Slovak Office, "[u]ntil now, the
Office has allowed entrepreneurs time to adopt [sic]. But this time is over and the Office is
beginning to apply sanctions." 1992 ANTIMONOPOLY OFFICE OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC ANN.
REP. I [hereinafter SLOVAK 1992 REPORT].
29. Polish Law, supra note 16, at art. 6. For a criticism of the exhaustive list approach,
see TADEUSZ SKOCZNY, COMPETITION LEGISLATION IN POST-SOCIALIST COUNTRIES 26-27
(1992).
30. Polish Law, supra note 16, at arts. 4.1-4.2.
31. Further, as Anna Fomalczyk, President of the Polish Antimonopoly Office, has stated,
"[tihe Polish law does not make a clear distinction between horizontal and vertical restraints,
but in practice we make distinctions based on what economics tells us about the likelihood that
restrictions will injure consumers." Anna Fornalczyk, Competition Law and Policy in Poland:
A Welcome and Warning to International Business, Speech to Budapest Conference 7 (June,
1992) (transcript on file with author) [hereinafter Fornalczyk Speech]. For a critical analysis
of articles 4.1 and 4.2 of the Polish Law, see Pittman, supra note 12, at 489.
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or may result in the elimination or restriction of competition.32 If the
practice is in the public interest, however (particularly in the areas of
manufacturing or technological or economic development), the Czech
Ministry may grant an individual exemption.33 Examples of prohibited
agreements and practices include price fixing, limitation of production,
market division, tying arrangements, concerted discrimination, and
restriction of market access.34 Similar to the Polish Law, the general
prohibition against such practices applies regardless of the offender's
market share. 35 Following EC competition law, the Czech Law establishes
block exemptions for cartels based on conditions other than price,
rationalization cartels, and de minimis cartels.36 Also, the Czech Law
authorizes the Czech Ministry to grant by decree additional block
exemptions. 37 Nonetheless, agreements covered by the block exemptions
still require approval from the authorities in order to become valid.3
The Slovak Law enumerates examples of monopolistic agreements
and practices that are unlawful if they have as their "object or effect" the
restriction of competition. Prohibited agreements and practices include
price fixing, limitation of production, market division, concerted discrimi-
nation, and tying arrangements ° While the law makes no distinction
between horizontal and vertical agreements, the Office has stated that
"vertical restraints will be evaluated more 'favourably' " under the new
32. Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 3. The sample list of agreements and practices
"disturbing competition" encompasses both vertical and horizontal restraints.
33. Czech Law, supra note 16, at arts. 5(l)-5(2).
34. Id. at art. 3(2).
35. For a critical analysis of Article 3, see Pittman, supra note 12, at 488-89.
36. Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 3(4).
37. The Czech Ministry may grant by decree block exemptions for agreements other than
agreements involving price setting "if the restriction of competition, to which the block
exemption would lead, is outweighed by the advantages for other participants in the market,
namely for the consumer." Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 6a. According to the legislative
record of the November 1993 Amendments, supra note 22, the Ministry may exercise its new
authority in the interest of flexibility in business relationships. Stanislav Bdlehrldek, Minister,
Czech Ministry of Economic Competition, Introduction to the November 1993 Amendments
(on file with author).
38. The Czech Ministry may refuse its approval if the contract contains commitments to
sell exclusively the goods covered by the agreement or goods identical or interchangeable with
those covered by the agreement, or if the contract contains commitments to exclude certain
entrepreneurs from the sale of goods or supply of services covered by the agreement and where
the restrictions do not represent a significant limitation of market competition. Czech Law,
supra note 16, at art. 5(3).
39. Slovak Law, supra note 16, at art. 3. This new "object or effect" test appears to be
much clearer than the former "result or may result" test. Compare id. with Czech Law, supra
note 16, at art. 3 (prohibiting practices that result or may result in the elimination or restriction
of competition).
40. Slovak Law, supra note 16, at art. 3(2). As in the Polish and Czech Laws, the general
prohibition against such practices applies regardless of market share. Id.
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law. 4' The Slovak Law exempts agreements that fulfill the following
criteria: improve production and distribution, promote technical or
economic progress, do not impose indispensable restrictions on competi-
tion, and do not allow the parties to eliminate competition substantially.
42
With the prime goal of promoting efficiency, the new Slovak Law no
longer allows the Slovak Office to grant individual exemptions. 3
Similar to the Czech and Slovak Laws, the Hungarian Law provides
examples of prohibited anticompetitive agreements including agreements
on price fixing, market division, boycotts, discrimination against pur-
chasers or sellers, limitation of production or distribution, and restriction
of market access. 4 These agreements are unlawful if they result in the
restriction or elimination of competition within Hungary, but they are not
unlawful if the resulting restriction of competition "does not exceed the
extent necessary" and if the advantages flowing from the agreement
outweigh the disadvantages.45 The Hungarian Law also sets out block
exemptions for agreements eliminating abuse of a dominant market
position and for agreements of "minor significance.
46
Despite, differences in structure, in practice each law's differing
prohibition against monopolistic practices has a similar impact. Specifi-
cally, because the types of monopolistic practices undertaken by com-
mercial entities in post-socialist economies are often similar,47 methods
41. Letter from Milan Banas, Slovak Antimonopoly Office, to author 3 (July 25, 1994) (on
file with author) [hereinafter Banas Letter].
42. Slovak Law, supra note 16, at art. 5(1). While the exemption is automatic, when a
substantial restriction on competition is suspected, the Slovak Office has the right to require
entrepreneurs to prove that an agreement meets all of the criteria. Banas Letter, supra note 41,
at 2-3. Based on the proof supplied, the Slovak Office will assess whether the harm to
competition resulting from the agreement would outweigh its advantages for consumer welfare.
Id. The parties may apply to the Slovak Office for negative clearance of a particular agreement.
Id. at 3.
43. Id. Compare id. with Czech Law, supra note 16, at arts. 5(l)-5(2) (allowing individual
exemptions). According to the Slovak Office, the new Slovak Law is modeled on the efficiency
concern embodied in American and French competition laws, as opposed to the fairness
concern embodied in German and other Central European laws, including those of Poland, the
Czech Republic, and Hungary. By focusing on efficiency and by exempting certain agreements
(particularly vertical ones) from the costly notification requirement, the Slovak Office hopes
to facilitate business activity and investment, particularly foreign investment. Telephone
Interview with Milan Banas, Slovak Antimonopoly Office (Aug. 15, 1994).
44. Hungarian Law, supra note 16, at art. 14.
45. The Hungarian Law provides that favorable impacts on prices, product quality, delivery
terms, distribution, or technological development are considered to be advantages and that a
joint market share exceeding 30% is a disadvantage. Id. at art. 17.
46. The Hungarian Law allows parties to apply to the Hungarian Office for negative
clearance of their agreement. Id. at art. 15.
47. For example, many investors, well aware of the post-communist states' dire need for
investment, assume that tying arrangements and exclusive distributorships as a means of market
entry will not be prohibited.
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of implementing and enforcing the laws tend to be similar. Further,
different prohibitions apply interchangeably because vague language
defines each prohibition. 4' For instance, in one decision, the Polish Office
prohibited a franchise agreement whereby the franchise (a newsstand)
agreed to purchase certain products only from the franchisor. In its
decision, the Office discussed onerous contract terms, restriction of
market access, and tying arrangements, without stating any one of the
prohibitions as the basis for its decision.49 Instead, the Office simply
explained that "in an economy undergoing transformation, it would be
likely that other distributors would be somehow forced into liquidation."5
In another decision, the Polish Office prohibited a sales agreement where
the manufacturer conditioned completion of the contract on payment to
its development fund, citing the prohibitions against onerous contract
terms and tying arrangements interchangeablySI
B. Market Dominance and Monopoly
52
All of the post-communist countries' laws prohibit anticompetitive
practices of entities occupying dominant or monopolistic positions. These
provisions are particularly important for two reasons. First, they provide
a means of controlling the legacy of state monopolies left behind by
central planning. Second, they alleviate the fear that privatization of state
monopolies will result in the creation of new private monopolies. Under
each of the laws, the competition authorities control the activities of firms
with dominant and monopoly positions and monitor concentration of the
market. Interestingly, unlike monopolistic practices, dominant and
monopolistic positions are not assessed by a balancing test. Instead, given
the degree of monopolization of the post-socialist economies, the laws
48. Examples of such vague language include "onerous contract terms," "restriction of
market access," and "discrimination."
49. Notably, the Polish Office did not look at whether or not other distributors could also
enter into similar vertical agreements, which was likely to be the case given the small amount
of capital required to establish a newsstand in Poland. Polish Antimonopoly Office (Wanda
Hauzer), Franchising (unpublished, available from the Polish Antimonopoly Office) (analyzing
RUCH franchise agreement).
50. The Polish Office also mentioned the franchisor's dominant market position in the
decision. Id.
51. Antimonopoly Office v. Jelcz Vehicle Factory (1990) (unpublished, available from the
Polish Antimonopoly Office).
52. This section will not discuss problems involving natural monopolies in the post-
socialist economies, the restructuring of which has proven to be an enormous task for the
competition authorities. For an in-depth analysis of possible solutions to natural monopoly
problems, see JANUSZ A. ORDOVER & RUSSELL W. PITTMAN, COMPETITION POLICIES FOR
NATURAL MONOPOLIES IN A DEVELOPING MARKET ECONOMY (U.S. Department of Justice
Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper No. EAG 92-9, Nov. 9, 1992).
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absolutely prohibit firms with substantial market power from engaging in
anticompetitive practices.
Pursuant to the Polish Law, an economic entity dominates either the
national or local market when it does not encounter "significant compe-
tition;" it is rebuttably presumed to have a dominant position if its market
share exceeds forty percent.53 If an economic entity does not encounter
any competition on the national or local market, it has a monopolistic
position. While mere possession of a dominant or monopolistic position
does not violate the Polish Law per se,54 dominant economic entities must
not inhibit "the formation of conditions indispensable for the creation or
development of competition, divid[e] the market," or sell commodities in
a discriminatory manner." Monopolistic economic entities must not limit
production, sales, or purchases of commodities, refrain from the sale of
commodities in a manner leading to an increase in prices, or demand
excessively high prices.56
Pursuant to the Czech Law, an economic entity has a dominant
position if it does not encounter "substantial competition" and if it
supplies the relevant market annually with at least thirty percent of identi-
cal, comparable, or "mutually commutable goods. 57 A dominant or
monopolistic entity must report its position to the authorities "without
delay. 58 Furthermore, it must not enforce disproportionate conditions on
other entities, impose tying arrangements, discriminate against other
entities, or limit or cease the production, sale, or technological develop-
ment of goods.59
Pursuant to the Slovak Law, an economic entity has a dominant
position if it does not encounter "substantial competition" on the market
or if it has the ability to behave independently from other entities and to
53. Polish Law, supra note 16, at art. 2(7). The Polish Office increased the dominance
threshold from a 30% threshold, which was perceived to be below Western standards, possibly
because the Office recognized that much of the post-socialist economy surpassed the 30%
threshold. Interview with Ewa Szymanska, Advisor to the President of the Polish Antimonopoly
Office, in Warsaw, Poland (Feb. 18, 1993).
54. Polish Law, supra note 16, at art. 2. The Polish Office, however, maintains a register
of all economic entities having a monopolistic position; such entities are required to notify the
Ministry of Finance prior to increasing their prices. 1992 ANN. REP. ON ACTIVITY OF THE
POLISH ANTIMONOPOLY OFFICE 13 [hereinafter POLAND 1992 REPORT].
55. Polish Law, supra note 16, at art. 5.
56. The Polish Law absolutely prohibits abuse of a monopolistic position. Id. at art. 7.
57. Czech Law, supra note 16, at arts. 9(1)-9(2). It is unclear in the Law whether the two
conditions to having a dominant position, one qualitative and the other quantitative, must both
be satisfied in order for an entity to be restrained. SKOCZNY, supra note 29, at 40.
58. Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 9(1). The Czech Law does not define the term
"monopoly."
59. Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 9(3).
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restrict competition. 60 An economic entity is presumed to have a dominant
position if its share of demand for or supply of "identical or interchange-
able" goods in the relevant market is at least forty percent.61 An economic
entity having a dominant position is prohibited from enforcing dispropor-
tionate conditions on or discriminating against other entities, from
imposing typing arrangements, and from limiting or ceasing production,
sale, or technological development of goods.62 The new Slovak Law does
not distinguish between a dominant position and a monopolistic posi-
61tion.
The Hungarian Law defines a dominant economic entity' as one who
is the only seller or purchaser of particular goods or whose share on the
market exceeds thirty percent.6' Dominant economic entities must not
impose onerous contract terms, refuse to conclude a contract "without
justification," exert undue influence on another economic entity, restrict
market access or technological development, or unjustifiably injure a
66competitor.
Because a large number of enterprises in the post-socialist economy
occupy dominant or monopolistic positions, the competition authorities
have had to allocate carefully their enforcement resources to only those
firms posing a substantial threat to competition and economic reform. The
authorities have also had to begin developing a means of defining and
regulating state monopolies, such as energy, transport, and communica-
tions monopolies. As large, state-owned monopolies naturally disintegrate
and methods of market measurement improve, however, the authorities
will be able to pursue abuse of market dominance more aggressively. 67
C. Merger Control
Since mergers occurred infrequently during the early stages of
economic transition, merger control initially was not a prominent function
60. Slovak Law, supra note 16, at art. 7(1).
61. Id. at 7(2). The Slovak Law defines relevant market as a "geographical and temporal
equilibrium of supply and demand for goods" which in terms of product, geography and time
are "identical or mutually interchangeable." Id. at 7(3). According to the Slovak Office, the new
definition of relevant market is intended to be as broad as possible. Banas Letter, supra note
41, at 4.
62. Slovak Law, supra note 16, at arts. 7(4) and 7(5).
63. Slovak Law, supra note 16, at art. 7(1).
64. This is referred to in the Hungarian Law as a position of "economic superiority."
Hungarian Law, supra note 16, at art. 21.
65. Id.
66. Id. at art. 20. The Hungarian Law does not contain separate provisions for entities
having a monopoly position.
67. Further, since the associated countries also seek to fully integrate into the EC, they will
eventually have to "adjust" all state monopolies pursuant to the EEC TREATY arts. 37 and 90.
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of the competition authorities. 68 The importance and frequency of merger
control is increasing, however, as the private sector grows and foreign
investment increases. Unfortunately, investors often are confused and
overcautious because the merger control provisions, similar to the other
provisions of the antimonopoly laws, contain vague language. Further,
since the provisions are applied based on the market impact of the
merger, market definition is an absolute prerequisite to enforcement;
however, the transitional nature of the post-socialist economies makes it
extremely difficult for the competition authorities to arrive at an appro-
priate choice of market, whether local, regional, or national. 69 As a result,
the merger control provisions of all of the laws have undergone continual
refinement and redefinition.
Under the Polish Law, the Polish Office can prohibit the merger,
transformation, or creation of an economic entity based on its impact on
competitiveness. 70 The Office must be notified of the intention to merge
or transform economic entities7' and of the intention to create a new
economic entity if the new entity could gain a dominant position on the
market or if one of the parties forming the entity already has such a
position.72 Within two months of receiving such notification, the Office
may issue a decision prohibiting the transaction if the entity would gain
or maintain a dominant position on the market. 73 The power to prohibit
transformations effectively links the Antimonopoly Law to the Polish
Privatization Law and provides the Antimonopoly Office with a signifi-
cant role in pre-privatization decisions.74 Specifically, the merger control
68. Throughout this article, the term "merger control" will be defined to include any
provisions of the antimonopoly law that require prior notification of a transaction, including
prior notification of joint ventures, mergers, acquisitions, and establishment of economic
entities.
69. See, e.g., Polish Antimonopoly Office (Elzbieta Modzelewska), Case Report: Polish
Antimonopoly Office v. District Milk Co-op in Radzyn Podlaski (1991) (unpublished, available
from the Polish Antimonopoly Office) (illustrating severe difficulties experienced by the Polish
Office in determining a relevant geographic market).
70. Polish Law, supra note 16, at art. 11(2).
71. Anyone acquiring 10%, 20%, 33%, 50%, 66%, 75% or more, respectively, of the
voting shares of any publicly-traded Polish corporation must notify the Antimonopoly Office
within seven days after such holding is obtained. Act of Mar. 22, 1991, on Public Trading in
Securities and Trust Funds, Dz.U. 1991 No. 35, Item 55, art. 72 [hereinafter Polish Securities
Law].
72. Polish Law, supra note 16, at art. I I(l).
73. Id. at art. 11(2). This decision obliges the registration court to refuse to enter the
economic subject into the commercial register. Id. at art. 11(5).
74. However, this power only applies to privatization through transformation, whereby the
assets of a state-owned enterprise are transferred to a newly established company, wholly
owned by the Polish State Treasury, and the company's stock is then sold to private parties
through either an auction, an initial stock offering, or a privately negotiated trade sale. It also
does not apply to privatization through liquidation, whereby state-owned assets pass directly
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provisions provide the Office with a means of preventing the creation of
new private monopolies during the process of privatization.
The Czech Ministry has the power to control mergers and acquisitions
where they result or may result in a limitation on economic competition.75
If the entities have a joint market share of thirty percent, mergers and
acquisitions are subject to control. Pursuant to the Czech Law, mergers
and acquisitions require prior approval of the Czech Ministry; other
concentrative agreements covered by the merger control provisions are
void unless approved.76 The Ministry uses a balancing test and must
approve a merger or acquisition where the economic advantages from the
merger outweigh its potential harm to competition."
In contrast to the Czech Law, the new Slovak Law provides two
alternative tests for merger control. Specifically, the Slovak Office has the
power to control mergers and acquisitions in two cases: (1) where the
entities have a combined turnover of at least 300 million Slovak crowns
and two or more of the parties achieved a turnover in the preceding year
of at least 100 million Slovak crowns each, or (2) where the joint market
share of the entities exceeds twenty percent.78 By establishing quantitative
criteria, the new Slovak Law closely parallels EC law.79 Pursuant to the
Slovak Law, a merger or acquisition covered by the Law's merger control
provisions must be notified to the Slovak Office. 80 For one month
following notification, the entities are prohibited from, taking any
from control of the ministry originally responsible for them to private control by asset sale,
contribution as capital into a newly created company, or lease. Law of July 13, 1990, on
Privatization of State-Owned Enterprises, Dz. U. 1990 No. 51, Item 298, arts. 5, 8, 23, 37. In
Poland, most privatizations have been carried out through liquidation. A Review of Privatisation
Methods, ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE, No. 51/52, Dec. 20-27, 1992, translated in POLISH NEWS
BULL., Dec. 22, 1992.
75. Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 8a(1). The Czech Law applies to a wide range of
activities through which one entity may acquire control over another, such as interlocking
directorates or joint ventures. Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 8(2).
76. Czech Law, supra note 16, at arts. 8a(3)(a) and 8a(3)(b).
77. Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 8a(2). The Czech Ministry has only begun to define
the factors it will use in weighing the advantages and detriments of a merger or acquisition. It
has, however, deemed access to foreign technology and markets as an advantage in its initial
rulings.
78. Slovak Law, supra note 16, at art. 9(1). Joint ventures that are "full-function"
enterprises will also be subject to merger control if they satisfy either of the tests. Banas Letter,
supra note 41, at 4.
79. EC law requires prior notification where the combined annual world sales of the
parties are at least ECU 5 billion (approximately U.S. $6 billion), and their combined annual
EC sales are at least ECU 250 million (approximately U.S. $300 million). Council Regulation
(EEC) No. 4064/89 of Dec. 21, 1989, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1.
80. The entities must notify the Slovak Office of the proposed merger or acquisition within
15 days from the date of announcement of a public bid, the date of conclusion of the relevant
agreement, or the date of acquisition of control over an enterprise or its part, as applicable.
Slovak Law, supra note 16, at art. 8(4).
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measures connected with the proposed merger or acquisition that would
"lead to irreversible changes."'" The Slovak Office must prohibit a merger
or acquisition that "creates or strengthens" a dominant position, unless the
entities can prove that the economic advantages from the merger or
acquisition outweigh its potential restriction on competition. 82
Similar to the new Slovak Law, the Hungarian Law provides two
alternative tests for merger control. Specifically, the Hungarian Office has
the power to control mergers and acquisitions where the joint share of the
parties would exceed thirty percent on the market, or where their joint
total sales would exceed 10 billion Hungarian forints [approximately U.S.
$120 million].83 By establishing quantitative criteria, the Hungarian Law
also parallels EC law.84 Moreover, by limiting the category of mergers
and acquisitions subject to prenotification to only those likely to weaken
competition substantially, the Hungarian Law has alleviated the workflow
of the Hungarian Office and reduced the potential for investor
85overcautiousness.
D. Demonopolization
Each of the competition authorities has developed a policy to address
large, state-protected monopolies. Only the Polish Office and the Czech
Ministry, however, have the legal authority to order the division or
liquidation of an entity, commonly referred to as the power of
"demonopolization." 86 Specifically, the Polish Office has the power to
order the division, liquidation or limitation of a dominant entity's eco-
nomic activity if it permanently limits competition or conditions of its
existence.87 The Czech Ministry can request a court to order the division
81. Id. at art. 9(6). Within one month of notification, the Office must approve or deny the
proposed merger or acquisition or, alternatively, issue a preliminary decision suspending the
merger or acquisition for a further three months. If the Office fails to issue a final decision
within three months of a preliminary decision, the merger or acquisition is deemed to be
approved. Id. at 10(1).
82. Id. at art. 10(2).
83. Hungarian Law, supra note 16, at arts. 23-27.
84. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
85. In the same vein, smaller mergers and acquisitions are not burdened by the pre-
notification requirement. RUSSELL PITTMAN, MERGER LAW IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
(U.S. Department of Justice Economic Analysis Group Discussion Paper No. EAG 92-2,
Jan. 9, 1992).
86. Polish Law, supra note 16, at art. 12; Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 11(2).
87. Polish Law, supra note 16, at art. 12. Pursuant to two alternative criteria developed
by the Polish Office, an entity "permanently limits competition" where either
a) the size of the assets and degree of concentration of the structure of the economic
entity creates a barrier to other economic entities taking up activity that would enable
them to compete seriously with the given entity, for entry into a given market would
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or transfer of one or more parts of an entity whose dominant or monop-
oly position seriously restricts, distorts, or prevents competition. 8
The power of demonopolization comprises an extremely forceful tool
for controlling and eliminating monopolies. Concurrently, however, this
power potentially allows the Polish Office and the Czech Ministry to
control market behavior, which is precisely the type of control that the
post-communist governments are seeking to avoid. This power must be
applied cautiously, therefore, in order for the competition authorities
accurately to apportion the market among free competition, oligopoly,
natural monopoly, and public property. 89 Although the work of the
competition authorities of Slovakia and Hungary would be greatly
facilitated by their acquisition of the power to divide, liquidate, or limit
the activity of monopolies, it has proven difficult to convince the post-
communist governments that such power will not be misapplied or
abused, intentionally or otherwise.90
II. ENFORCEMENT POWERS
Established during the advanced stages of disintegration of central
planning, the competition authorities play a larger and more ambitious
role than their counterparts in market-based countries. These authorities
must maintain and promote competition during the process of privatiza-
tion by ensuring that state-owned monopolies do not simply become
private ones.9 The authorities must also ensure that as the private sector
begins to function it will do so in a competitive manner. Armed with far-
reaching enforcement powers, the authorities must balance full and
require too large investments, or
b) the given economic entity has a 'firmly established' market position through
market contacts that entities just entering the market would have to establish.
Polish Antimonopoly Office, supra note 17, at 23.
88. Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 11(2).
89. 1994 ANTIMONOPOLY OFFICE OF POLAND BULL. 13 (Preview Issue) [hereinafter
POLAND BULL.].
90. Telephone Interview with Danica Paroulkova, Director of the Secretariat, Slovak
Antimonopoly Office (Apr. 30, 1993); Telephone Interview with Jozsef Sarai, Coordinator for
International Affairs, Hungarian Office for Economic Competition (Apr. 29, 1993).
91. As stated by British Member of Parliament John Redwood,
[w]ithout careful handling, the problem of monopoly can bring privatisation into
disrepute.... A monopoly transferred to the private sector without controls could
easily fall into the hands of those who not only wish to perpetuate bad service and
high prices but also to exploit the pricing power the monopoly enjoys to make even
bigger profits.
OLIVER LETWIN, PRIVATISING THE WORLD: A STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL PRIVATISATION IN
THEORY AND PRACTICE xv (1988).
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aggressive enforcement against the practical limitations that stem from
recession, double-digit inflation, political instability, and strong pressures
from special interest groups.92 Such limitations threaten the continuity of
the economic reforms, despite the governments' proven firm resolve in
seeing the reforms through to completion. 93 As economic reform pro-
grams become irreversible, however, the competition authorities are likely
to enforce the competition laws in a more consistent, efficient, and
aggressive manner.
94
All of the antimonopoly laws facilitate the competition authorities'
ability to monitor the market by obliging economic entities to provide
assistance to the authorities as they perform their enforcement and control
functions. Certain officials of the competition authorities have the power
to enter the premises of an economic entity, inspect its documents, and
compel disclosure of relevant information.95
A. Available Enforcement Measures
In connection with the competition authorities' discretion to deem
practices as anticompetitive, all of the authorities have a wide choice of
measures available to counteract monopolistic practices. The Polish Office
may order practices to be ceased or prices to be lowered and may prohibit
the implementation of an agreement.96 The Office may also impose a fine
of up to fifteen percent of the after-tax profit of an entity for the preced-
ing year, decreased by the amount of turnover tax paid.97 While decisions
of the Office may be appealed to the Antimonopoly Court, the Office
may declare its decision to be immediately effective. 98
92. For example, the Polish Office explains how the Office "declined to impose fines on
the companies, considering the poor financial situation of the cartel participants." POLAND 1992
REPORT, supra note 54, at 5.
93. See, e.g., Jane Perlez, Leftist Leader Is Named Prime Minister of Poland, N.Y. TIMES
INT'L, Oct. 15, 1993, at A6. The Polish Office in particular has added the struggle against
protectionism and special interests to its list of principal tasks. Id.
94. As stated by the Slovak Office, "[c]onsistent application of the competition protection
act can enhance the progress of fair competition and by this way to secure freedom for
economic competition." SLOVAK 1992 REPORT, supra note 28, at 1.
95. Polish Law, supra note 16, at arts. 19-20; Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 1l(i);
Slovak Law, supra note 16, at art. 11(]); Hungarian Law, supra note 16, at art. 36.
96. Polish Law, supra note 16, at arts. 8-9. Agreements in violation of the prohibitions
against monopolistic practices are invalid by law, in whole or in part. Id. at art. 8.2. The power
to order an entity to lower its prices is equivalent to the price controls that existed under central
planning.
97. Id. at art. 14. This sanction can be criticized as being ineffective because often entities,
especially state-owned entities, do not have after-tax profit. A more effective sanction would
be to look to total turnover for the preceding year, in accordance with EC law.
98. Polish Law, supra note 16, at art. 10. The decisions of the Antimonopoly Court are
final. Id. at art. 25(4). The Antimonopoly Court was created in 1990 as a special court for cases
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The Czech Ministry may order that any "irregularities" in activity
with respect to the Czech Law be removed and may issue an injunction
against prohibited activity upon commencement of proceedings before the
Ministry.9 9 The Czech Ministry may impose a fine of up to ten percent
of an entity's turnover for the preceding year; such fine must at least
equal the amount of profit gained by the entity from breaching the law."
Decisions of the Czech Ministry may be appealed to regular Czech
courts. 0 1
The Slovak Office may deem anticompetitive agreements to be void,
order a dominant entity to refrain from abusing its position, and issue an
injunction against prohibited activity upon commencement of proceedings
before the Office.' ° The Slovak Office may impose a fine of up to ten
percent of an entity's turnover for the preceding year; such fine must at
least equal the amount of profit gained by the entity from breaching the
law. 10 3 Decisions of the Slovak Office may be appealed to regular Slovak
courts. 104
In comparison with the other laws, the choice of enforcement mea-
sures available to the Hungarian Office is innovative. After a complaint
is filed with the Office, an expert group examines the case and prepares
a report. Three members of the Office's Competition Council examine the
report and hold a hearing on the matter. 0 5 The Council has the power to
confirm a violation of the law, prohibit continuation of an illegal practice,
impose a fine,'O° or request "additional measures" as necessary. 7
involving monopolistic practices. Minister of Justice Decree of Apr. 13, 1990, regarding the
Creation of the Antimonopoly Court, Dz.U. 1990 No. 27, Item 157.
99. Czech Law, supra note 16, at arts. I l(1)(e) and I l(l)(g).
100. Id. at art. 14(4). The Czech Ministry may also impose fines on an entity of 300,000
Czech crowns for failing to provide information to the Ministry, 100,000 Czech crowns for
obstructing or failing to attend oral proceedings, and 1,000,000 Czech crowns for failing to
comply with a decision of the Ministry. Id. at arts. 14(1)-(3). The Czech Law explicitly "does
not exclude criminal liability" in addition to any fine imposed. Id. at art. 14(5).
101. Id. at art. 12(8).
102. Slovak Law, supra note 16, at arts. 11(1) and 12(6).
103. Id. at art. 14(1). The Slovak Office may also impose fines on an entity of I million
Slovak crowns for failing to provide information to the Office or failing to comply with a
decision of the Office and 100,000 Slovak crowns for obstructing or failing to attend oral
proceedings. Id. at arts. 14(2)-(4).
104. Id. at art. 13(1).
105. The Vice President of the Hungarian Office, who serves as President of the
Competition Council, selects a three member Competition Council for each case. The
Competition Council is comprised of three employees of the Office, two of whom are lawyers
or judges and one of whom is an economist. Telephone Interview with Gabor Szoboszlay,
Hungarian Office for Economic Competition (Apr. 8, 1993).
106. A fine may be as much as double the amount of the financial advantage gained or
damage caused by the wrongdoing. Hungarian Law, supra note 16, at art. 48(1).
107. Id. at art. 43. Pursuant to the Hungarian Law, parties planning to conclude an
1145
Michigan Journal of International Law




Under each country's antimonopoly law, the competition authority
plays a crucial role in the creation, development, and protection of
competition on the market. Increasingly, the competition authorities are
assuming more active roles in the development of the emerging market
economies by becoming more deeply involved in privatization and by
establishing measures aimed at demonopolization. Unfortunately, some of
the more painful effects of economic reform, such as rising unemploy-
ment and inflation, create political pressures that hinder full and aggres-
sive enforcement in both of these areas. Given the similar nature of the
transitions ongoing in each country and their synchronous pursuits of full
EU membership, the problems faced by each authority share several
features. Nevertheless, constrained by limited resources, each of their
enforcement efforts has developed a distinct focus.
The Polish enforcement efforts are part of the overall policy of the
Polish Office to develop competition and to protect enterprises and
consumers against "anticompetitive practices." °09 The Office has focused
most of its efforts on cases involving monopolistic practices, particularly
those involving imposition of onerous contract terms and tying arrange-
ments, although it has begun to devote a larger percentage of its enforce-
ment efforts to the prohibition against abuse of a dominant or monopolis-
tic position.'10 The Office has used the prohibition against imposition of
onerous contract terms to combat monopolies and monopolistic behavior
without the need for an investigation into market share."1 The Office has
agreement may request from the Hungarian Office a preliminary decision that "the contem-
plated agreement is not prohibited" or that it falls under one of the exemptions of the law. Once
the Hungarian Office has issued such a decision, it may not later challenge the agreement or
any activities undertaken by the parties pursuant to the agreement. Id. at art. 18.
108. Michael Reynolds, Taking on the Competition, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1992, at 9,
9.
109. 1991 ANN. REP. OF POLAND TO THE OECD COMMITTEE ON COMPETITION LAW AND
POLICY 5 (May 1992) [hereinafter POLAND OECD REPORT]. See also, POLISH ANTIMONOPOLY
OFFICE, COMPETITION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (1991-1993).
110. However, 20% of the cases involved an enterprise having a dominant or monopolistic
position. POLAND OECD REPORT, supra note 109, at 5. The Polish Office only recently has
begun to apply its power of demonopolization, and from 1991 to 1993 the Office initiated
demonopolization proceedings in only four sectors: the grain-milling, wood, seed, and meat
sectors. POLISH ANTIMONOPOLY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 23-24.
111. Thus, one sees the Polish Office charging monopolies with the universal prohibition
against onerous contract terms, judged by a test of reasonableness, even though the law
embodies per se illegality for anticompetitive practices of monopolies. This has been especially
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relied on this approach where an investigation into market share has
proven extremely difficult or even impossible, a situation not uncommon
in the post-socialist economies where barriers to market entry are con-
stantly changing, accounting systems are poor and inaccurate, and market
data is generally hard to obtain. The prohibition against onerous contract
terms has often been the Polish Office's only means for combatting
monopolistic practices of state-protected monopolies."
2
The Czech enforcement efforts stem from the desire of the Czech
Ministry to pursue demonopolization while simultaneously preventing an
increase in the concentration on the market. 13 In the absence of the
express power of demonopolization," 4 the Czech Ministry has focused
most of its enforcement efforts on combatting abuse of a dominant or
monopolistic position." 5 In particular, the Ministry has focused on abuse
of a dominant position in the context of privatization by analyzing the
post-privatization competitiveness of state-owned entities undergoing
privatization. 16 At the same time, the Ministry has begun to emphasize
merger control as a means to prevent reconcentration of the market.17
Similar to the Czech Ministry, the Slovak Office is pursuing
demonopolization and deconcentration of the market while having no
true for the Polish telecommunications, transportation, and energy monopolies. See, e.g., Polish
Antimonopoly Office (Krzysztof Filinski), Case Report: Polish Antimonopoly Office v. Centrala
Produktow Naftowych PP (Commercial Centre for Oil Industry Enterprise) (1992) (unpublished,
available from the Polish Antimonopoly Office); Polish Antimonopoly Office (Zofia
Wlodarczyk), Case Report: Polish Antimonopoly Office v. Telekomunikacja Polska (Polish
Telecommunications) (1993) (unpublished, available from the Polish Antimonopoly Office).
112. See cases cited supra note I 11.
113. As stated in the Economic Bulletin of the Czech Ministry, "[tlhe activities of the
office focus on three areas of the protection of competition [abuse of dominant or monopoly
position, merger control, and cartel agreements], all three of decisive importance, and generally
accepted by the European Community." 1992 CZECH OFFICE FOR ECON. COMP. ECON. BULL.
3 [hereinafter CZECH BULL.].
114. While the Czech Ministry acquired the power of demonopolization pursuant to the
November 1993 Amendments, the Ministry is likely, following the Polish example, initially to
apply this power with extreme caution, if at all. See supra, note 110 (discussing the Polish
example).
115. In the years 1991 and 1992, the Czech Ministry dealt with 181 cases involving abuse
of dominant or monopolistic position, 39 cases involving mergers, and 29 involving cartel
agreements. Czech Ministry of Economic Competition, Review of Czech Ministry of Economic
Competition Decisions July 1991 through December 1992 (document on file with author).
116. As explained by one representative of the Czech Ministry, "we have had the largest
number of cases stemming from abuse of dominant position because it is connected to
privatization. [The Czech Republic] has monopolies from former times and their activities
constitute abuse because they have no competition." Telephone Interview with Ivo Bezecny,
Office of the Minister, Czech Ministry of Economic Competition (Sept. 1, 1993).
117. As further described by the representative, "mergers are also important to the Ministry
because the Ministry prefers division over joining." Id.
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express power to liquidate or divide economic entities. ' 18 Thus, the
Slovak Office focuses much of its enforcement efforts on cases involving
abuse of a dominant position, particularly those involving restriction of
market access and tying arrangements."1 9 Simultaneously, however, the
Slovak Office has begun to focus on monopolistic practices and, in
particular, on cases involving horizontal agreements either to fix prices
or to restrict market access.
120
The Hungarian Office also has focused most of its efforts on cases
involving abuse of a dominant position and, in particular, on cases
involving discrimination and restriction of market access by entities
holding such a position. 12 According to the Hungarian Office, the number
of cartel and merger control cases has remained small because of the
continually evolving Hungarian economic situation and because of the
extremely high rate of market entry and exit, both of which make it
unfavorable or even impossible for firms to coordinate their behavior. 122
Similarly, since both newly established enterprises and enterprises that
were divided during the process of privatization tend to be small in size,
the scale of mergers has been relatively modest. 123 Nonetheless, as the
number and size of new enterprises increases, the Office anticipates the
emergence of a new market structure in Hungary that will allow viable
118. According to the Slovak Office, "[tihe new tendency in 1992, compared with last
year, is that the abuse of monopolistic and dominant positions is growing as evidenced by the
amount of complaints received by the Office from outside." SLOVAK 1992 REPORT, supra note
28, at 3.
119. 1991 SLOVAK ANTIMONOPOLY OFFICE ANN. REP. 17 [hereinafter SLOVAK 1991
REPORT].
120. Whereas abuse of dominant position cases accounted for 68 percent of the cases of
the Slovak Office in 1991, cartel agreement cases accounted for 62 percent of the cases of the
Office in 1992. SLOVAK 1992 REPORT, supra note 28, at 6-7, 21. In the first six months of
1993, however, the highest number of cases of the Slovak Office once again involved abuse
of a dominant position. Competition Policy, FIN. TIMES E. EUR. Bus. L., Jan. 1994, at 9.
121. This statistic excludes cases focusing on unfair competition, in particular false
advertising, which actually constitute the largest number of cases of the Hungarian Office. 1993
OECD ANN. REP. ON THE 1992 ACTIVITIES OF THE HUNGARIAN COMPETITION AUTHORITIES
AND THE EXPERIENCE GAINED DURING THE APPLICATION OF THE COMPETITION ACT 9-10, app.
I [hereinafter HUNGARY OECD REPORT].
122. As explained by one representative of the Hungarian Office, "when one's partners
are always changing, it is extremely difficult to find a partner with whom one may enter into
cartel practices." Telephone Interview with Jozsef Sarai, Coordinator for International Affairs,
Hungarian Office for Economic Competition (Aug. 26, 1993).
123. Further, although many joint ventures between foreign investors and state-owned
enterprises have been significant in size, the Hungarian Law does not regard foreign investors
as Hungarian "market actors" since they are not registered in Hungary. Thus, much investment
activity falls outside of the scope of the Law. However, a foreign investor that acquires a
Hungarian enterprise and then, as a registered Hungarian entity, acquires a second Hungarian
enterprise is regarded as a "market actor" under the law. HUNGARY OECD REPORT, supra note
121, at 14-15.
1148 [Vol. 15:1129
Summer 1994] Competition and Antitrust Law in Central Europe
firms to engage in cartel practices and mergers. Consequently, the Office
expects the number of cartel and merger control cases to increase.
124
Each of these antimonopoly laws was designed to accommodate the
special characteristics of the post-socialist economies, such as the high
degree of monopolization and severe problems of market measurement.
The vague language of the laws and the discretion of the competition
authorities freely to shift their enforcement efforts comprise means of
introducing and protecting competition in these highly transitional
economies. While essential during the initial stages of economic trans-
formation, such means create substantial uncertainty and unpredictability
for market participants as to the decisions and direction of the competi-
tion authorities. Aware of this situation, the competition authorities
currently are striving to balance their enforcement efforts more evenly
between monopolistic practices, abuse of a dominant position, merger
control, and demonopolization. As the economic transitions draw nearer
to completion, the competition authorities will need to clarify the laws
through consistent decisions and enforcement.
The above discussion brings us to the present stage of development
of competition policy in the associated countries and the enforcement
focus of the competition authorities. Having examined the internal
competition regimes of each country, this article now examines some of
the external factors that are shaping these regimes.
III. HARMONIZATION: THE EUROPE AGREEMENTS
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary are all in the
process of becoming Associate Members of the EU pursuant to nearly
identical Europe Agreements. 2 5 In return for the possibility of becoming
full EU member states upon expiration of the ten-year Agreements, these
countries must open up their markets to the EU and harmonize their laws
with EU law, including EC competition and trade law.' 26 The commercial
portions of the Europe Agreements, referred to as the Interim
124. Id.
125. Romania and Bulgaria signed similar Europe Agreements with the EC on Feb. 1,
1993, and Mar. 8, 1993, respectively. Telephone Interview with Klaus Schneider, Deputy Head
of Unit, External Economic Relations, Relations With Russia, European Commission Director-
ate General 1 (Feb. 25, 1993). Russia and Belarus, and all of the other former Soviet republics
apart from the Baltic States, are negotiating "Partnership Agreements" with the EC, which are
structurally similar to the Europe Agreements but do not embody the potential for membership,
the eventual creation of a free trade zone, or harmonization of their national laws with EC
commercial law. Id.
126. Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 113, at art. 69; Czech Republic Europe
Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 70; Slovakia Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 70;
Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note 113, at art. 68.
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Agreements, were entered into effect in March 1992 and govern free
movement of goods, current account payments, and competition between
each of the associated countries and the EU.1
27
The Europe Agreements link many areas of previously domestic
policy and decision-making of the associated countries to approval by the
EU. 128 In addition to more concrete linkages, the Europe Agreements
require the associated countries and the EU to undertake economic,
cultural, and financial cooperation, i29 and they implement a framework for
regular political dialogue between the associated countries and the EU.,
30
While the Europe Agreements contain provisions addressing freedom of
establishment,' 3 ' fair competition, 132 labor force flow, balance of
127. Interim Agreement with Poland, 1992 O.J. (L 114) 2 [hereinafter Interim Agreement
with Poland]; Interim Agreement with the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, 1992 O.J. (L
115) 2 [hereinafter Interim Agreement with Czech and Slovak Federal Republic]; Interim
Agreement with Hungary, 1992 O.J. (L 116) 2 [hereinafter Interim Agreement with Hungary].
Despite the defederation of the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Interim Agreement
between the EC and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic remains in force with minor
amendments to the provisions regarding the allocation of quotas between the Czech Republic
and Slovakia. Telephone Interview with Dusan Ondrejicka, Director of the Phare Coordination
Office, Bratislava, Slovakia (Dec. 10, 1993).
128. For an analysis of the legal basis, structure, and objectives of the Europe Agreements,
see Marc Maresceau, The Association Agreements Between the European Community and
Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (unpublished draft conference
paper presented at the ECSA-Est conference on Sept. 14-15, 1994, in Brussels, Belgium).
129. Stated areas of cooperation include: investment promotion and protection, agricultural
and industrial standards, science and technology, energy and environment, transport, telecom-
munications, banking, insurance and financial services, tourism, and small and medium-sized
enterprises. The EC is to assist the associated countries in restructuring their economies and in
developing their monetary policies, including the introduction of full convertibility of their
national currencies and the approximation of their monetary policies with the European
Monetary System (EMS). Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at arts. 71-101; Czech
Republic Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at arts. 72-103; Slovakia Europe Agreement, supra
note 14, at arts. 72-103; Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at arts. 70-103.
130. The preamble to each Interim Agreement states that "the aim of the Europe
Agreement is to provide an appropriate framework for political dialogue" between the EC and
each associated country. Interim Agreement with Poland, supra note 127, at preamble; Interim
Agreement with Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, supra note 127, at preamble; Interim
Agreement with Hungary, supra note 127, at preamble.
131. Freedom of establishment means that companies organized in one member state must
establish and maintain businesses in another member state under conditions no less favorable
than those that the host country law accords to its own nationals and companies. Steven M.
Schneebaum, The Company Law Harmonization Program of the European Community, 14 LAW
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 293, 295-96 (1982). See also Clark D. Stith, Federalism and Company
Law: A "Race to the Bottom" in the European Community, 79 GEo. L.J. 1581 (1991). To be
achieved through harmonization, freedom of establishment was one of the main objectives of
the momentous "EC 1992" program, pursuant to which the EC was required to take all
measures necessary to establish the internal EC market by December 31, 1992. Claus-Dieter
Ehlermann, The "1992 Project": Stages, Structures, Results and Prospects, II MICH. J. INT'L
L. 1097, 1103 (1990).
132. Similar to the concept of antitrust legislation in the United States, the "fair competi-
tion" provisions deem the following practices to be "incompatible with the proper functioning"
of the Association Agreements: (i) agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations
1150 [Vol. 15:1129
Summer 1994] Competition and Antitrust Law in Central Europe
payments, and eventual free movement of goods, 33 services, capital, and
individuals, they do not establish a true common market between the
associated countries and the EU because they contain important limita-
tions on the movement of persons, services, and capital. 134 Specifically,
the movement of persons is limited to certain "key personnel" of compa-
nies established in the EU by each associated country pursuant to the
freedom of establishment provisions.' 35 Also, the freedom to establish
companies on equal terms does not apply to air transport, inland water-
way, or maritime cabotage transport services.
36
In the legal sphere, the Europe Agreements require the associated
countries to strive for complete harmonization within ten years of their
respective national laws with EU law and evolving EU legal standards.137
of undertakings, and concerted practices between undertakings having as their object or effect
the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition; (ii) abuse by one or more undertakings
of a dominant position in the EC or in [the associated country]; and (iii) public aid which
distorts or threatens to distort competition. Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 113, at art.
63; Czech Republic Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 64; Slovakia Europe Agreement,
supra note 14, at art. 64; Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 62. For an analysis
of competition policy as an instrument for assisting the former Soviet bloc nations to establish
market economies, see Fox & Ordover, supra note 3.
133. The Interim Agreements require the EC to lift immediately duties on the majority of
Polish, Czech, Slovak, and Hungarian goods, gradually lift duties on specific goods such as
textiles and steel, and gradually abolish import quotas (effective immediately for steel import
quotas). Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary must each lift duties on approxi-
mately 27% of EC imports, primarily raw materials, semi-finished products, and capital
equipment, and must gradually lower the remaining duties by 20% each year from 1995.
Eventually, each of the associated countries will create a free trade zone with the EC, excluding
food products. Hungary has nine years, the Czech Republic and Slovakia each have nine years,
and Poland has seven years to abolish import duties on imports from the EC. Interim Agree-
ment with Poland, supra note 127, at art. 4(3); Interim Agreement with Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic, supra note 127, at art. 4(4); Interim Agreement with Hungary, supra note
127, at art. 4(3).
134. Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at arts. 37-43, 55-57, and 59-62; Czech
Republic Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at arts. 38-44, 56-58, and 60-63; Slovakia Europe
Agreement, supra note 14, at arts. 38-44, 56-58, and 60-63; Hungary Europe Agreement,
supra note 14, at arts. 37-43, 55-57, and 59-61.
135. Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 52; Czech Republic Europe
Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 53; Slovakia Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 53;
Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 52.
136. While the EC member states must grant full freedom of establishment to Polish,
Czech, Slovak, and Hungarian companies, exclusive of non-"key" employees, the associated
countries are required to grant freedom of establishment only gradually. Poland Europe Agree-
ment, supra note 14, at art. 44; Czech Republic Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 45;
Slovakia Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 45; Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note
14, at art. 44.
137. The Europe Agreements state that
[t]he approximation of laws shall extend to the following areas in particular: customs
law, company law, banking law, company accounts and taxes, intellectual property,
protection of workers at the workplace, financial services, rules on competition, pro-
tection of health and life of humans, animals and plants, consumer protection,
indirect taxation, technical rules and standards, transport and the environment.
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The Europe Agreements expressly recognize that, for each country's
economic integration into the community, "the major precondition" in the
case of Poland and Hungary and "an important condition" in the case of
the Czech Republic and Slovakia "is the approximation of that country's
existing and future legislation to that of the Community.' 38 Although the
final goal of harmonization is the successful admission of the associated
countries into the EU as full member states, from the point of view of
competition, several of the interim goals are equally important. Specific-
ally, harmonization with EU law should provide a stable legislative
framework for economic reforms such as privatization of state-owned
industry'39 and genuine encouragement of foreign investment.140 Further,
increased commercial activity and industrial cooperation with the EU
should increase competitiveness in each of the associated countries. 141
The Europe Agreements provide a timetable for implementation,
42
comprised of a maximum transition period of ten years that is divided
into two successive stages of five years in principle.' 43 The first stage
commences on the date the Europe Agreements enter into force.' 44 During
the final year of the first stage, the respective "Association Councils" to
Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 69; Czech Republic Europe Agreement, supra
note 14, at art. 70; Slovakia Europe Agreements, supra note 14, at art. 70; Hungary Europe
Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 68.
138. Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 68 (emphasis added); Czech
Republic Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 69 (emphasis added); Slovakia Europe
Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 69 (emphasis added); Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note
14, at art. 67 (emphasis added).
139. Each of the associated countries has designed a variety of privatization programs to
accommodate the wide range of state-owned enterprises inherited from the centrally planned
economy.
140. Brzezinski, supra note 26, at 129.
141. DOLAN, supra note 1, at 105-08, 139-157, 390-398.
142. This timetable applies to the Europe Agreements in their entirety with the exception
of those provisions governing the free movement of goods. Poland Europe Agreement, supra
note 14, at art. 6(4); Czech Republic Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 7(4); Slovakia
Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 7(4); Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at
art. 6(4). The process of integration into the EC is spread over several years so that the aspiring
member states, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, may sufficiently
adjust and improve their economies and competitive positions in order to adopt the rules of the
EC. Romana Sadurska, Reshaping Europe-Or "How to Keep Poor Cousins in (Their) Home":
A Comment on the Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. 2501, 2505 (1991).
143. Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 6(1); Czech Republic Europe
Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 7(1); Slovakia Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 7(1);
Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 6(l). Eschewing the notion of "gradual"
integration, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are pressing for imminent integration.
See, e.g., Czechs Want Trade Link to EU Now, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 11, 1994, at 2;
Hungary and Poland Bang on EU's Opening Door, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Mar. 8, 1994, at 2.
144. Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 6(1); Czech Republic Europe
Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 7(1); Slovakia Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 7(1);
Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 6(1).
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be established under each Agreement 145 must decide upon the transition
to the second stage, including any modifications required for its imple-
mentation. 146 The Association Councils will also periodically examine the
associated countries' progress toward implementation of the respective
Agreements, creation of market economies, and harmonization of law.
47
In light of decisions made at the EC Copenhagen summit in June 1993,
the actual time frame for implementation of the Agreements may be
accelerated. 
48
The Europe Agreements directly incorporate the competition provi-
sions of the Treaty of Rome, including Articles 85, 86, and 92, as well
as the methods used by the EC to interpret and enforce them.
49
145. Each Agreement provides for the establishment of an Association Council, comprised
of members of the European Council of Ministers, the European Commission, and the
respective national governments, to supervise implementation of the Agreement. Poland Europe
Agreement, supra note 14, at arts. 102-110; Czech Republic Europe Agreement, supra note
14, at arts. 104-112; Slovakia Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at arts. 104-112; Hungary
Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at arts. 104-112.
146. Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 6(3); Czech Republic Europe
Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 7(3); Slovakia Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 7(3);
Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 6(3). The harmonization provisions of the
Europe Agreement are governed by the two-stage timetable, with the exception of intellectual
property law. Specifically, the Europe Agreements require the associated countries to provide
within five years "a level of protection similar to that existing in the Community, including
comparable means of enforcing such rights." Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art.
66; Czech Republic Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 67; Slovakia Europe Agreement,
supra note 14, at art. 67; Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 65.
147. Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 6(2); Czech Republic Europe
Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 7(2); Slovakia Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 7(2);
Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 6(2).
148. Although the EC did not establish a date at the summit for the "mid-term review"
of the Europe Agreements, it did state in its summit conclusions that
'[t]he European Council today agreed that the associated countries in Central and
Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European Union.
Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to assume the
obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and political conditions
required.'
Charles Goldsmith, EC Summit Reaches Easy Accord on Steps To Strengthen Ties With Eastern
Europe, WALL ST. J. EUR., June 23, 1993, at 2.
149. Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at arts. 63-67; Czech Republic Europe
Agreement, supra note 14, at arts. 64-68; Slovakia Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at arts.
64-68; Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at arts. 62-66. The Agreements also contain
prohibitions against: (i) preferential treatment of so-called public undertakings, Poland Europe
Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 65; Czech Republic Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art.
66; Slovakia Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 66; Hungary Europe Agreement, supra
note 14, at art. 64; (ii) prohibitions against dumping and other non-tariff barriers, Poland
Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at arts. 29 and 35; Czech Republic Europe Agreement, supra
note 14, at arts. 30 and 36; Slovakia Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at arts. 30 and 36;
Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at arts. 29 and 35; (iii) prohibitions against
discrimination in the award of public contracts, Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at
art. 67; Czech Republic Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 68; Slovakia Europe Agree-
ment, supra note 14, at art. 68; Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 66; and (iv)
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Importantly, the Europe Agreements mark the first time that the EU has
included a competition section in an association agreement, thus greatly
augmenting the role of the competition authorities in the associated
countries. The Europe Agreements explicitly state that any practice
contrary to the competition provisions of the Agreements shall be
assessed on the basis of the rules of Articles 85, 86, and 92 of the Treaty
of Rome. 5' Nonetheless, under the Europe Agreements, two important
"1exceptions" to the rules apply to the associated countries.
The first exemption is that the provisions do not have direct effect;
rather, the Association Councils are to adopt the necessary rules for their
implementation and enforcement, referred to as the "implementation
measures."' 51 Until such time as the implementation measures are adopt-
ed, the EU may apply the competition provisions of the Treaty of Rome
under the "effects doctrine" articulated in the renowned Wood pulp
case.5 2 In the Wood pulp case, the European Court of Justice held that
the European Commission' 53 has extraterritorial competence to apply
Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome to an agreement made outside
the EU by foreigners, if the agreement is implemented in the EU and
regardless of whether the foreigners conduct activity within the EU.
54
Polish, Czech, Slovak, and Hungarian companies trading with the EU
therefore may become subject to Articles 85 and 86 even before the
implementation measures have been developed by the Association Coun-
cils.' 55
requirements that the associated countries adjust any monopolies of a commercial character to
eliminate any discrimination in procurement or marketing of goods by the end of the fifth year
of entry into force of the Agreements, Poland Europe Agreements, supra note 14, at art. 32;
Czech Republic Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 33; Slovakia Europe Agreement,
supra note 14, at art. 33; Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 32.
150. Interim Agreement with Poland, supra note 127, at art. 33(2); Interim Agreement with
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, supra note 127, at art. 33(2); Interim Agreement with
Hungary, supra note 127, at art. 32(2).
151. Interim Agreement with Poland, supra note 127, at arts. 37-38; Interim Agreement
with Czech Republic and Slovak Federal Republic, supra note 127, at arts. 37-38; Interim
Agreement with Hungary, supra note 127, at arts. 36-37.
152. Maresceau, supra note 128, at 14-15.
153. In 1965, the functions of the EEC, the ECSC, and the EURATOM were consolidated
in the Commission of the European Communities [hereinafter European Commission] pursuant
to the Treaty Instituting a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Commu-
nity, art. 9, 1967 0.1. (C 152) 2. The EEC, the ECSC, and the EURATOM are discussed supra
note 4.
154. Commission Decision No. 85/202/EEC of Dec. 19, 1984, relating to a proceeding
under Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC
COMMUNITY, reprinted in 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (1958) [hereinafter EEC TREATY].
155. According to the Commission, "the decisive factor is where the agreement, decision
or concerted practice is implemented whether or not the producers had recourse to subsidiaries,
agents, subagents, or branches within the Community in order to make their contracts with
purchasers within the Community." Id.
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While the Association Councils have three years from their estab-
lishment within which to adopt the implementation measures, the Joint
Committees established under previous agreements between the associated
countries and the EU 156 have already begun to draft such measures. 57 In
general, implementation measures govern the respective competencies of
the national and EC competition authorities, 58 the secrecy and confi-
dentiality of information, the applicability of block exemptions, and the
participation of national competition authorities in EC merger control
proceedings.59 Uniformly, the jurisdictional limitation of the Europe
Agreements to agreements and undertakings "in so far as they may affect
trade between the Community" and the associated country has created
significant drafting problems for the competition authorities.' 60 In order
to diminish the ambiguity created by this vague jurisdictional limitation,
the draft Polish implementation measures expressly exempt activities
"whose effects on trade ... are negligible."'' 6' Effects on trade are
presumed to be negligible where the aggregate turnover of the parties
does not exceed ECU 200 million and where the market share of the
goods or services in question does not exceed five percent in the area of
the EU and Poland, respectively, affected by the agreement. 62
The second exemption to the Treaty of Rome rules is that Poland, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary must maintain transparency with
regard to all public aid and must submit annual reports to the EU
156. Under the provisions of the Interim Agreements, the Joint Committees previously
established by the Agreement on Trade and Commercial and Economic Cooperation, signed
between the EEC and Poland on September 19, 1989, and between the EEC and Hungary on
September 26, 1988, and the Supplementary Protocols to the Interim Agreement on Trade and
Trade Related Matters, signed between the EC and the ECSE and each of Czech Republic and
Slovakia on December 16, 1991, are to perform the duties of the Association Councils prior
to their establishment. Interim Agreement with Poland, supra note 127, at art. 37; Interim
Agreement with Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, supra note 127, at art. 37; Interim
Agreement with Hungary, supra note 127, at art. 36.
157. The Joint Committee for Poland has already completed its final draft of the imple-
mentation measures. Interview with Ewa Szymanska, Advisor to the President of the Polish
Antimonopoly Office, in Warsaw, Poland (Aug. 5, 1993). The Hungarian Office has submitted
to the EC its first draft of the implementation measures and hopes to complete a final version
by mid-1994. Telephone Interview with Jozsef Sarai, Coordinator for International Affairs,
Hungarian Office for Economic Competition (Dec. 13, 1993).
158. With regard to competency, the implementation measures generally cover notification
procedures, consultation and comity, conflicts, and negative conflicts of competence.
159. See, e.g., Draft Implementing Rules for the Application of the Competition Provisions
Applicable to Undertakings Provided for in art. 33 of the Interim Agreement between the EC
and Poland (1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Poland Draft Implementing Rules].
160. Interview with Ewa Szymanska, supra note 157.
161. Poland Draft Implementing Rules, supra note 159, at art. 8.
162. Id.
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detailing the total amount and distribution of aid granted. 163 During the
first five years, any public aid granted by any of the countries shall be
assessed under Article 92 of the Treaty of Rome as aid that "promote[s]
the economic development of areas where the standard of living is
abnormally low or where there is serious underemployment,"'" and the
aid shall be assessed by the European Commission under a lower standard
of authorization. 165 Not surprisingly, the competition authorities are facing
significant opposition to the notion of transparency from large state
enterprises, which over the past four decades have become particularly
adept at concealing their true financial health.
166
Pursuant to the legal reforms required under the harmonization
provisions of the Europe Agreements, the competition laws of the
associated countries will increasingly resemble the competition laws of
the EU and of EU member states. Simultaneously, however, the compe-
tition law regimes of each country are being shaped by the demands and
conditions of the economic reforms underway in each associated country.
This article now turns to these reforms, their interrelation with EU
integration, and their impact on competition law.
IV. THE POST-SOCIALIST ROLE OF COMPETITION LAW
Because competition policy forms the centerpiece for the transition
from socialism to market-based economies in the post-communist Central
European countries, the competition authorities naturally play vital roles
in all areas of economic reform. The following discussion explores
163. Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 63(4)(b); Czech Republic Europe
Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 64(4)(b); Slovakia Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art.
64(4)(b); Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 62(4)(b). The term "state aid"
under Article 92(1) of the Treaty of Rome comprehensively includes grants, preferential state
loans, favorable tax treatment, and financing from compulsory contributions of beneficiaries.
VALENTINE KORAH, AN INTRODUCTORY GUIDE TO EEC COMPETITION LAW AND PRACTICE 21
(4th ed. 1990).
164. The Association Council shall, based on the progress achieved pursuant to the
economic reforms of each country, decide whether the five year period should be extended for
an additional five years. Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 63(4)(a); Czech
Republic Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 64(4)(a); Slovakia Europe Agreement, supra
note 14, at art. 64(4)(a); Hungary Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 62(a).
165. The provisions on public aid do not apply to the agricultural and fisheries sectors.
Poland Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 63(5); Czech Republic Europe Agreement,
supra note 14, at art. 64(5); Slovakia Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 64(5); Hungary
Europe Agreement, supra note 14, at art. 62(5).
166. Further, most laws in force in the associated countries do not authorize the competi-
tion authorities to verify the level of subsidies being given to state enterprises. In the case of
Poland, it is unlikely that the Polish Office will acquire the authority to verify the level and
type of state aid being granted by the government. Instead, an inter-governmental group,
comprised of several ministries and government agencies, will be formed for such purpose.
Interview with Ewa Szymanska, supra note 53.
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whether the competition authorities are fulfilling their roles by analyzing
their respective efforts in the following areas: creation of the private
sector economy, demonopolization, and harmonization of national law
with EC competition law.
A. Creation of the Private Sector Economy
In the post-communist Central European economic transitions,
restructuring and privatization are two key components of competition
policy.' 67 The goals of restructuring and privatization are mutually
reinforcing: restructuring prior to privatization relieves an enterprise of
unrelated and unproductive assets and ensures that state-owned monopo-
lies do not become private ones; 68 privatization frees an enterprise from
state involvement and subjects it to market forces. 69 Similar to competi-
tion policy goals, the policy goals of restructuring and privatization
include adaptation to market forces, improved productivity, efficiency and
transparency in operations, introduction of incentive pay systems, and
creation or expansion of marketing programs. 70
Under socialism, organization of industry was often artificially based
on considerations other than supply and demand in order to facilitate
command distribution methods and central planning. 171 Active restructur-
ing seeks to decrease the size of artificially large enterprises, thereby
reducing production concentration levels, and to separate unrelated
portions of enterprises. Passive restructuring seeks to force enterprises to
restructure spontaneously by exposing them to market forces. The
competition authorities play an important role in the restructuring of
industries and enterprises. Through demonopolization, merger control, and
prosecution of abuse of market dominance, the competition authorities
167. For purposes of simplicity, privatization will be broadly defined here to mean the
transfer of state-owned property to private hands.
168. According to the Polish Antimonopoly Office, "[i]t turns out that privatization of an
enterprise often involves replacing a state monopoly with a private one." Anti-Trust Office on
Monopolies, ZYCIE WARSZAWY, No. 35, Feb. 11, 1993, at 11, translated in POLISH NEWS
BULL., Feb. 28, 1993. Thus, as stated the President of the Polish Office, Anna Fornalczyk,
" '[tihe Anti-Trust Office represents the interests of the competition, and not the public inter-
est .... [T]he Office not only prevented monopolistic practices, but it also 'kept an eye' on
structural changes in the economy.' " Id.
169. See generally ROMAN FRYDMAN, ET AL., THE PRIVATIZATION PROCESS IN CENTRAL
EUROPE (1993).
170. As an intermediary step, the World Bank has advised Poland to place all state-owned
enterprises under the commercial code, which would be tantamount to mass commercialization.
World Bank, Report No. 10305-POL, Poland: Economic Transformation at a Crossroads 33
(Mar. 16, 1992) (on file with author).
171. DOLAN, supra note 1, at 428-32.
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assist in active restructuring.7 2 Through import liberalization and the
counteraction of monopolistic practices, the competition authorities
increase the exposure of enterprises to market forces and thereby contrib-
ute to passive restructuring.
73
The competition authorities play a similar fundamental role in
privatization. As explained by one of the principal authors of Poland's
economic reforms, Professor Leszek Balcerowicz, privatization in the
post-communist Central European countries may be defined and analyzed
pursuant to one of two concepts. 7 1 Viewed narrowly, privatization
comprises only transformation or the transfer of state-owned assets to
private ownership. 175 Viewed broadly, privatization includes the narrow
definition as well as the creation of new economic entities and so-called
"greenfield" investment. 176 When analyzed under the narrow concept,
privatization has been relatively unsuccessful, partly because the methods
used, such as trade sales and public offerings, require efficient operation
of advanced state institutions, the creation and development of which
have been extremely difficult or lacking.177 When analyzed under the
broad concept, however, privatization has been extremely successful due
to the rapid pace of new private investment and small-scale and asset
privatization. 178 Because of the disparate nature of the two concepts of
privatization, the role of the competition authorities under each concept
varies. This articles explores the two roles separately, examining the
narrow concept first. 179
172. Active restructuring corresponds to the "structural function" of the competition
authorities, which involves eliminating the causes of monopolization. POLAND BULL., supra
note 89, at 9-10.
173. Passive restructuring corresponds to the "regulatory function" of the competition
authorities, which involves mitigating the consequences emanating from a highly monopolized
economy. Id. at 7-8.
174. Leszek Balcerowicz, Address to International Professional Women's Group, Warsaw,
Poland 3-4 (Jan. 18, 1993) (transcript on file with author).
175. Professor Jeffrey Sachs has referred to the narrow concept, pursuant to which "state
assets are transferred to private owners," as "top-down privatization." Jeffrey D. Sachs,
Privatization in Russia: Some Lessons from Eastern Europe, AEA PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS
43, 44 (May 1992).
176. Professor Jeffrey Sachs has referred to the broad concept, pursuant to which "private
firms are established and grow," as "bottom-down privatization." Id. at 44.
177. See, e.g., Lucja Swiatkowski Cannon, Privatization Strategy and its Political Context
in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN POLAND 123 (R. Staar ed., 1993).
178. See, e.g., 1992 EUR. BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEv. ANN. ECON. REV.
38-48, 62-69 (Feb. 1993) [hereinafter EUR. BANK ANN. ECON. REV.] (noting, however, that
small-scale privatization in Hungary has lagged behind that in other Central European
countries). Asset privatization essentially involves lease or sale of assets by large, state-owned
enterprises to the private sector.
179. Although separable, the two concepts are naturally related in that the new private
sphere must often rely on existing distribution arrangements and suppliers which have protected
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1. Privatization and Restructuring
Each of the associated countries has developed national privatization
programs geared toward deep and fundamental transformation of the
state-owned economy.' 80 In 1990, Poland initiated several privatization
programs having different scopes and time frames, including "mass," so-
called "sectoral," and "fast-track" programs. 18' The mass privatization
program involves the simultaneous privatization of several hundred large,
state-owned enterprises through the formation of national investment
funds. 182 The sectoral program involves dividing the Polish economy into
sectors and developing privatization schemes for each sector. 183 The fast-
track or "quick" program involves privatization of small- and medium-
sized enterprises through direct negotiations with investors.
184
Similarly, while still a federation in 1991, Czechoslovakia com-
menced a variety of privatization programs. In 1992, the federal govern-
ment initiated a mass privatization scheme of approximately 1,500 of the
federation's largest enterprises."8 5 Aside from mass privatization, the so-
called Large Privatization and Transformation Law allows large state-
owned enterprises to select their own privatization strategy, subject to
governmental approval. 186 The so-called Small Privatization Law allows
market positions. Similarly, with the continual disintegration of the socialist network, existing
enterprises often have to procure supplies and sales in the competitive market comprised of the
new private businesses.
180. Similar to the French privatization program commenced in 1986, the privatization
programs of the associated countries are modeled on general laws designed to provide
flexibility and expediency in the overall process. LETWIN, supra note 91, at 15.
181. Wladyslaw Jermakowicz, Privatization in Poland: Aims and Methods, Ministry of
Privatization 25-30, Paper presented at the U.S. Poland Chamber of Commerce (May 18,
1992).
182. Ustawa z dnia 30 kwietnia 1993r. o narodowych funduszach inwestycynych i ich
prywatyzacji, Dz.U. 1993 No. 44, Item 202. See generally, Case Program, Poland's Mass
Privatization Program, John F. Kennedy School of Governmlent, Harvard University (1992).
183. For these purposes, the Polish economy was initially divided into 34 sectors, such as
shoes, machine tools, cables and conductors, construction, rubber products, breweries, fat,
sugar, etc. Jermakowicz, supra note 181, at 25-30.
184. MINISTRY OF PRIVATIZATION, INFORMATION GUIDE TO THE MINISTRY OF PRIVAT-
IZATION 11 (1991).
185. The program is based on vouchers sold in two phases to citizens for nominal sums.
In the first phase, nearly 80% of the population purchased vouchers, and enterprises accounting
for a third of the federation's output were subjected to privatization. Holders were entitled to
bid their vouchers for shares in any of approximately 1500 state-owned enterprises. To
encourage and assist voucher holders in their investments, several hundred private investment
funds pledged to buy vouchers for up to 10 times their purchase price. Financial Times Survey:
Privatisation in Eastern Europe, FIN. TIMES, July 3, 1992, at 1, 3.
186. Undertaken in two phases comprised of 2000 enterprises each, the first phase was
slowed after the government received nearly 13,000 privatization proposals from the first group
of enterprises. EUR. BANK ANN. ECON. REV., supra note 178, at 40.
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small companies to privatize themselves through auctions."' After the
federation ceased to exist, the two nations enacted legislation modifying
the second phase of the mass privatization program to require that citizens
invest in companies only in their respective countries. 88
Hungary formally commenced its privatization programs in 1990 with
the establishment of the State Property Agency. 89 The State Property
Agency developed the First Privatization Program, for the privatization
of twenty enterprises from the manufacturing, hotel, tourism, commerce,
trade, and transportation sectors, and the Second Privatization Program,
for the privatization of forty to sixty enterprises that had transferred most
of their assets to joint venture companies with foreign partners.'9° In addi-
tion, under the so-called Transformation Act, which provides for trade
sales, the State Property Agency receives twenty percent of the shares of
a transformed enterprise while the remaining eighty percent may be sold
to investors.' 9' The Hungarian government also formulated the Small
Investors Shareholders' program, a mass credit scheme whereby each
Hungarian citizen over the age of eighteen years eventually can borrow
up to 100,000 forints in order to purchase shares in Hungarian enter-
prises. 192
Programs such as those created by the post-communist Central
European governments provide for nationwide privatization on multiple
levels. Each country faces similar challenges in implementing its privat-
ization programs, and each competition authority faces similar oversight
187. The Small Privatisation Act applies to small businesses and parts of businesses in the
spheres of services, trade and production. ERNST & YOUNG, EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRY
PROFILES 40 (Aug. 1992).
188. Czechoslovakia to Split Privatizations, INT'L HERALD TRI., Aug. 1-2, 1992, at 9;
Cacilie Rohwedder, Slovakia's Leader Seeks to Revamp Nation's Image, WALL ST. J. EUR.,
Mar. 1, 1993, at 4.
189. Act VII of 1990 on the Foundation of the State Property Agency, as amended by Act
LIV of 1992 on the Sale, Utilization and Protection of Assets Temporarily Owned by the State.
190. Hubertus V. Sulkowski et. al., Privatisation in Hungary: The Art of the Possible,
INT'L FIN. L. REV., Apr. 1991, at 32, 34.
191. Most privatizations of Hungarian state-owned enterprises have proceeded in this
manner, with multinational companies comprising over 85% of the investors. The first
enterprises to be purchased were consumer goods enterprises, many of which had pre-existing
trade and licensing relationships with their foreign purchasers. Financial Times Survey, supra
note 185, at 4.
192. In order to be eligible, citizens will have to pay a 1000 forint fee and repay the loan
over five years, after which time they will be the owners of the shares in which they have
invested. Tim Smart, Eleventh-Hour changes for Small Investors' Program, BUDAPEST WK.,
Aug. 26, 1993, at 7. The Hungarian government has also devised a plan of mass commercial-
ization, pursuant to which the State Property Agency may order, or a state-owned enterprise
may volunteer for, the transformation of a state-owned enterprise into a limited liability
company or a company limited by shares. Act LIV of 1992 on the Sale, Utilization and
Protection of Assets Temporarily Owned by the State, Hatalyos MJ 1992 No. 111/20.
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responsibilities with regard to each of the privatization programs. Specif-
ically, the competition authorities must ensure that asset sales and
acquisitions are conducted in a competitive manner and through compet-
itive tenders, while avoiding any unfair disadvantage to their nationals.
Also, the competition authorities must prevent, in each country's drive to
attract foreign investors, monopolistic practices and investments that
effectively replace state monopolies with new private ones.193 Finally, the
competition authorities must monitor the practices of privatized firms to
ensure that they do not resume their former monopolistic practices.
1 94
Rather than the competition authorities, governmental authorities
almost exclusively control privatization policy and decision-making in the
post-communist Central European countries. Although privatization
decision-makers uniformly assess privatization proposals on the basis of
offered price, investment plans, access to markets, employment, and
environmental protection considerations, they generally do not evaluate
seriously a proposal's effect on competition. 195 To introduce a competi-
tion-based component into the privatization analysis, the competition
authorities have applied the antimonopoly laws' prohibitions against
acquisition and maintenance of market dominance to entities undergoing
privatization. Toward this end, the Polish and Hungarian Offices similarly
approach privatization under their merger control provisions. The Polish
Office, however, may prevent a new company from forming if a first-time
foreign investor would acquire a monopoly, while the Hungarian Office
may only interfere in cases of "merger or fusion."' 96 Further, while
neither the Polish nor the Hungarian Laws require notification in cases of
share acquisitions, 97 the Polish Law expressly provides that an acquisition
of shares or assets may be a prohibited monopolistic practice "when such
193. In Poland, Italy's Fiat Company was coming dangerously close to acquiring a
monopoly position on the Polish car market, a factor the government finally took into account
in deciding between investors. Often foreign investors demand conditions to investment that
they would not demand in the West, such as guarantees of "temporary" local monopolies and
protection from imports. See, e.g., Fornalczyk Speech, supra note 31, at 6.
194. In this regard, the experience of Great Britain in the 1980s, with the privatization of
state electricity, water, gas, airline and telephone monopolies, may be instructive. In order to
prevent exploitation of monopoly power by the privatized monopolies, the government
established regulatory authorities to govern the'privatized entities. See generally RICHARD
WHISH, COMPETITION LAW 30 (1989).
195. POLAND BULL., supra note 89, at 9.
196. Hungarian Law, supra note 16, at arts. 23-27. The Hungarian Office curiously states
that "[iln privatisation cases where a particular owner appears for the first time on the
Hungarian market, there are no concentrations, only ownership changes. Therefore, in such
cases it is logical that privatisation cannot be assessed from the point of view of competition
law." HUNGARY OECD REPORT, supra note 121, at 14-15.
197. Compare the Polish Securities Law, supra note 71, and see the text accompanying
note 71.
1161
Michigan Journal of International Law
acquisition could lead to a significant weakening of competition." 98 Since
neither of the laws provides for notification in the case of liquidation,
which is the most frequent and expedient form of privatization, they
potentially allow investors to purchase and consolidate assets that effec-
tively confer market dominance.
The Czech and Slovak authorities deal with privatization outside of
the law's regular merger and control provisions. Specifically, the Czech
and Slovak Laws contain "transitory provisions" that require state ad-
ministrative bodies during the process of privatization to submit to the
competition authorities an analysis of the post-privatization competitive-
ness of an entity.199 The analysis must contain sufficient guarantees that
any pre-transfer monopolistic position of an entity will be eliminated and
that any new entity created will not obtain a monopolistic position.2" If
the state administrative body disagrees with the ruling of the relevant
competition authority on the analysis, then the analysis must be submitted
to the respective Czech or Slovak government for approval. 20' While this
approach is extremely progressive in comparision with the Polish and
Hungarian approaches, its impact in the Czech Republic has been greatly
diminished by the law's exclusion of "state enterprises and organizations
beneficial to the public [and] state monopolies created by law. 20 2 By
excluding state protected monopolies, the law risks condoning that which
it seeks to prohibit, the creation of private monopolies.
20 3
Because a competitive post-privatization economy is significant for
the various privatization programs to succeed, the competition authorities
should participate more in pre-privatization decisions. The arrangement
between the Hungarian Office and the Hungarian State Property Agency
provides an instructive model for other competition authorities to follow.
198. Polish Law, supra note 16, at art. 4.1.3.
199. Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 19(2); Slovak Law, supra note 16, at art. 19(2).
200. Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 19; Slovak Law, supra note 16, at art. 19. The duty
to submit such an analysis also applies to the transfer of state-owned property to a state-owned
joint stock company.
201. Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 19(2); Slovak Law, supra note 16, at art. 19(2).
202. Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 19(3)(a). The merger control provisions of the
Czech Law also exempt the Czech National Property Fund (the main privatization agency of
the Czech Republic) and the Czech Land Fund, but only for a period of one year. Id. at art.
8a(4).
203. This risk became a reality in the Czech tobacco sector when, as a result of special
protection, Philip Morris acquired a solid 85% market share of the Czech tobacco sector
through its acquisition of a majority stake in the sole Czech tobacco producer, Tabik. Craig
Karmin, Where There's Smoke . . ., Bus. CENT. EUR., July/Aug. 1993, at 25. Under intense
pressure from the Czech Ministry, the Czech Parliament passed legislation abolishing the state
monopoly as of January 1, 1994. Vladimir Petrus, End of Tobacco Monopoly, FIN. TIMES E.
EUR. Bus. L., Feb. 1994, at 3 (discussing Tobacco Act 303/1993).
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In Hungary, all state-owned assets are concentrated under the control of
either the State Property Agency or state holding companies, which have
the authority to restructure and privatize such assets. The Hungarian
Office holds a seat on the State Property Agency's board of directors,
which affords the Office the opportunity to hear and influence privatiza-
tion decisions. 2°4 This formal link between the competition authority and
the privatization authority allows for greater consistency between privat-
ization and competition policy.
2. Development of the New Private Sector
Although competition was introduced slowly into the state sector, it
arose swiftly and spontaneously during the formation of the burgeoning
new private sectors. The success of competition in spurring entrepre-
neurial initiative has not gone unnoticed by either the consumers of the
associated countries, who now enjoy the fruits of greater abundance and
variety, or other newly-emerging entrepreneurs, who realize that they too
may fruitfully engage in competition. The new private sectors were
formed largely through foreign investment, trade liberalization, and
entrepreneurial initiative.
(i) Foreign Investment
In the area of foreign investment, the competition authorities' main
focus has been on exclusive distributorships, acquisitions, and joint
ventures between domestic enterprises and foreign firms seeking to take
advantage of an existing dominant position.2"5 In the absence of adequate
means for gathering and analyzing investment information, the competi-
tion authorities have struggled to monitor such transactions.206 Despite
intense pressure to allow foreign investment at any price, the competition
204. Telephone Interview with Janos Stadler, Vice President for Investigation, Hungarian
Office for Economic Competition (Aug. 10, 1993).
205. Interview with Director Leon Biegunski, Director of the Department of Antimonopoly
Policy, Analysis and Control, Polish Antimonopoly Office (Feb. 24, 1993); Interview with
Sarai, supra note 122.
206. In general, the competition authorities tend to approve such mergers, due to the
considerable benefits flowing from foreign investment, such as foreign know-how and
technology. See, e.g., POLISH ANTIMONOPOLY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 26 (Polish Office
approved all merger applications during 1990-1993). Nevertheless, merger control provides an
important check on economic activity in the state-owned sector and sends an important message
to all parties that foreign investment must be undertaken in compliance with the antimonopoly
laws. See, e.g., SLOVAK 1991 REPORT, supra note 119, at 26-72 (reporting the approval of a
merger between Slovak Cases Tesla Liptovsky Hradok and Standard Elekrik Lorenz A.G., the
denial of a merger between Hydrostav s.p. Bratislava and Haupler Brau A.G., and the denial
of a merger between Hydrostav s.p. Bratislava and Volksbank Wien); HUNGARY OECD
REPORT, supra note 121, at 22 (discussing the LINDE Gaz Hungary PLC merger approval).
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authorities are seeking to limit anticompetitive foreign investment incen-
tives.
The Czech Ministry's merger control is the most aggressive. The
Ministry maintains a systematic and detailed filing procedure for mergers
that "result or might result in a restriction on competition in the relevant
market., 20 7 Under such a broad formulation, and in the absence of a
market share threshold, most joint venture parties feel compelled to apply
for clearance from the Czech Ministry. By contrast, since the Polish,
Slovak, and Hungarian thresholds for merger notification are much
higher,2"8 notification is a less routine practice in Poland, Slovakia, and
Hungary than in the Czech Republic.
(ii) Import Liberalization
Each competition authority exerts control over import liberalization
by establishing and dismantling tariff and non-tariff trade barriers. 209 In
each of the associated countries, import liberalization has increased
successfully the competitiveness of both state and private economic enti-
ties, which benefits suppliers, distributors, employees, and consumers.
2 0
All of the competition authorities resist growing pressures and
excessive attempts to expand domestic market protection against
imports.211 To resist such pressures, representatives of the Polish Office
207. Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 8(a)(1). The Czech Ministry furnishes parties to
a merger with the following documents: (i) an instruction form specifying the requirements of
a filing with the Office; (ii) a detailed questionnaire; and (iii) a supplemental question form to
be completed only by the foreign party to the transaction. CZECH BULL., supra note 113, at
9-10. See also Czech Ministry of Economic Competition, Model Study, Topic: Horizontal
Agreements/International Joint Venture (1992-1993); Vladimfr B6.rt6, Director of the 11 Execu-
tive Department, Czech Ministry of Economic Competition, International Joint Venture: General
Remarks (1992-1993).
208. Polish Law, supra note 16, at art. 11(1); Slovak Law, supra note 16, at 9(1);
Hungarian Law, supra note 16, at arts. 23-27. According to the Polish Office, a joint venture
is only treated as a "merger" if the investor invests in one Polish company and uses that Polish
company to purchase a second Polish company; thus, joint ventures are essentially exempt from
the Polish Law's merger requirement. Interview with Biegunski, supra note 205.
209. See Fornalczyk Speech, supra note 31, at 5-6.
210. For a discussion of this phenomenon, see Fox & Ordover, supra note 3, at 12. As
stated by Anil Sood, Head of the World Bank's Financial Department,
'[o]nly now it has become clear how profitable it was to liberalise trade. Perhaps the
World Bank would have advised Poland to liberalise its trade gradually and to spread
it out over a three to four year period. Now it has turned out, however, that the
liberalisation of trade has greatly increased the competitiveness of Polish products.
The Hungarians, whom we have praised so much for their caution, have turned out
to be overly cautious.'
World Bank on Polish Economy, RZECZPOSPOLITA, No. 146, June 25, 1993, at 9, translated in
POLISH NEWS BULL., June 30, 1993.
211. Notably, foreign investors have been major opponents of the competition authorities
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participate on the Inter-Ministry Commission for Updating and Modifying
Customs Tariffs on Imports and on other commissions that prepare
regulations introducing foreign trade quotas and concessions.1 2 In the
experience of the Polish Office, liberalizing foreign trade and conse-
quently imposing competitive pressure on the Polish economy is "a more
efficient tool [than administrative commands] for introducing market
functions and behavior., 21 3 The Hungarian Law, on the other hand,
requires the government to invite comments from the Hungarian Office
on any draft legislation that influences competition, including trade
legislation.21 4 The Hungarian Office also participates in all cases submit-
ted by Hungarian companies to the Hungarian Ministry of Trade that
involve claims of unfair trade protectionism. 215 Similarly, the Slovak
Office monitors the impact of tariff and non-tariff trade-regulation
measures with regard to the competition level for each industry in the
economy.216
(iii) Entrepreneurial Initiative
The pace of entrepreneurial initiative in the post-socialist economies
in the form of new trade, manufacturing, and service businesses is
astounding. For example, in Poland more than 500,000 private sole
proprietorships were created from December 1989 to October 1991, and
approximately 34,000 private companies were created from the end of
1989 to the end of 1991.27 New private businesses in the Czech
in this area. As stated by President Fornalczyk,
[i]t is interesting that although protectionism in our economy is opposed by foreign
firms wanting to make shipments into Poland, much of the support for protectionism
has come from foreign investors .... This has been one of the most common
requests for more than two years. There is a serious dilemma for us, because we
need foreign capital, know-how and new methods of management.
Fornalczyk Speech, supra note 31, at 6.
212. POLAND 1992 REPORT, supra note 54, at 11.
213. Id. Further, in 1991 Poland commenced its Competition Development Project aimed
at consistently reducing protection from foreign competition for domestic producers. POLISH
ANTIMONOPOLY OFFICE, supra note 109, at 5.
214. In 1992, the Hungarian government invited comments from the Hungarian Office on
over 200 pieces of draft legislation. HUNGARY OECD REPORT, supra note 121, at 11.
215. Interview with Stadler, supra note 204.
216. SLOVAK 1991 REPORT, supra note 119, at 76. While the Czech Ministry regularly
presents suggestions to the Ministry of Trade, the two ministries as co-equal bodies do not
formally cooperate. Letter from Ivo Bezecny, Office of the Minister, Czech Ministry of
Economic Competition, to author 2 (July 31, 1993) (on file with author).
217. Sachs, supra note 175, at 44.
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Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary also developed rapidly.28 With regard
to the new private sectors, the competition authorities have focused on
enforcement of the prohibitions against monopolistic practices and agree-
ments. 219 Initially, seventy percent of the Polish Office's decisions
220
involved monopolistic practices or agreements of entities that usually did
not have dominant or monopolistic positions.22' Recently, however, the
Polish Office has attempted to balance its enforcement efforts more
equally among the three areas.222
Enforcement of the prohibitions against monopolistic practices and
agreements under the antimonopoly laws forms a relatively flexible
component of competition policy partly because it may be used selec-
tively. Two special factors influence enforcement in these areas. First,
entrepreneurial or productive initiative could be stifled if the competition
authorities rigidly oppose potentially anticompetitive agreements. Second,
market measurement problems often preclude enforcement of the prohibi-
tions in many borderline cases. As the number of new businesses contin-
ues to rise and competition on the market increases, the potential for
collusion will naturally intensify. As a result, the role of the competition
authorities in monitoring and enforcing the prohibitions against monopo-
listic practices and agreements is certain to expand.
B. Demonopolization
The overall structure of the socialist economy was purposely
anticompetitive, designed to facilitate central planning through control of
large-scale production units and large firms integrated both horizontally
and vertically. To facilitate control, factories were grouped together into
218. Survey, Business in Eastern Europe, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 21, 1991, at 14.
219. POLISH ANTIMONOPOLY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 47-57; 1993 SLOVAK
ANTIMONOPOLY OFFICE ANN. REP. 32-33 (1994).
220. POLAND OECD REPORT, supra note 109, at 5. A typical case involved an attempt to
restrict market access through an exclusivity clause in a contract between a fast-food caterer
and a railway station. Polish Antimonopoly Office (Piotr Kryczek), Case Report: Railway
Station Catering Case (1991-1992) (unpublished, available from the Polish Antimonopoly
Office).
221. In contrast, 11% of the cases of the Hungarian Office involved monopolistic practices
and agreements. HUNGARY OECD REPORT, supra note 121, at app. 1. In addition, the
Hungarian Office has made use of the Hungarian Law's prohibition against unfair competition
and of the so-called blanket clause, which declares that "freedom and fairness of economic
competition must be respected" and prohibits unfair market practices, to regulate new
businesses. Hungarian Law, supra note 16, at art. 3. See, e.g., HUNGARY OECD REPORT, supra
note 121, at 17-18 (discussing 1992 ALVORADA Ltd. Case and 1992 SIGNAL DISCOUNT
Ltd. Case).
222. POLAND 1992 REPORT, supra note 54, at 3-8; SLOVAK 1992 REPORT, supra note 28,
at 2.
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large enterprises employing several hundred individuals. The socialist
economies were broken down into broad sectors, such as steel, sugar,
textiles, trucks, and rubber. Individual enterprises used generic names
such as "truck enterprise" or "rubber factory" in order to preclude brand
name distinction that might stimulate competition. Moreover, "enterprise
associations" between firms at the industry level often functioned as
cartels and reinforced the anticompetitive nature of industry.223
One of the competition authorities' prime tasks is to ensure that
existing monopolies divide into efficient, autonomous parts.224 Prohibiting
monopolistic practices, controlling market dominance and monopoly, and
engaging in merger control all inadequately address the monopolistic
legacy of central planning.225 Similarly, privatization and restructuring
programs generally proceed too slowly to combat monopoly problems and
exclude many sectors of the economy. 226 Thus, a more forceful instru-
ment, such as the "power of demonopolization," was sought and created
by the competition authorities, most successfully by the Polish Office.227
Several problems arise from demonopolization. First, due to the scale
of its effects, the competition authorities must possess sufficient informa-
tion to support a division or liquidation decision, and they must avoid
focusing on individual sectors without paying proper attention to the
economy as a whole.228 Thus, the Polish Office has been extremely
cautious in using its power to divide or liquidate enterprises, stating that
"hitherto undertaken partitioning operations showed a great number of
methodological problems connected first of all with the concept of the
local market and the methods of defining its range and also problems the
source of which is the insufficiency of the informational base. 229
Second, without concurrent restructuring and privatization within an
industry, a phenomenon may occur known as "reconcentration," which is
223. See generally, DOLAN, supra note 1, at 446-48.
224. In 1990, Lipton and Sachs advised in their reform proposals for these countries that
the second step of reform can be undertaken in parallel with the macroeconomic austerity
program and that it should be a step to create market competition that is based on the
deregulation of prices, free trade, the full liberalization of the private sector, and the
demonopolization of the state sector. Lipton & Sachs, supra note 2, at 100.
225. POLISH ANTIMONOPOLY OMCE, supra note 17, at 22.
226. Id.
227. See, e.g., supra note 86 and accompanying text.
228. This is particularly true for the post-socialist economies in transition. When trying
to restructure, it is important to a given sector to maintain the structure of a separate but related
sector until the restructuring process has been completed. For instance, in restructuring a manu-
facturing sector, the government may have to maintain a temporarily guaranteed inflow of
inputs from a second sector so that investor interest remains high.
229. Andrzej Szablewski, Polish Antimonopoly Office, Activity of the Antimonopoly
Office in the Year 1991 8 (1992).
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the re-emergence of collusive behavior between recently divided firms."'
Divided firms, experiencing for the first time real competitive forces, try
to fight competition through collusion, in particular through horizontal
agreements and mergers, rather than try to adapt to the market economy
and compete individually.23' In this case, one sees recently divided firms
conspiring to lower their production levels below capacity and, also,
pressing for government protection through subsidies, custom tariffs, and
border taxes.232
Finally, the competition authorities must proceed cautiously in the
case of state protected monopolies such as telecommunications, oil and
gas, and agricultural monopolies.23 3 Many state-owned monopolies have
tried to survive economic transition through monopolistic practices and
coercion of customers rather than adapting to the market economy
through measures aimed at increasing productivity and efficiency.2 34 The
role of competition authorities in such cases has been to prosecute these
"survival tactics" under the general prohibition against monopolistic
practices, at least until such monopolies are either restructured or privat-
ized.235
Thus, while the Polish Office considers the role of demonopolization
to be an important part of the nation's transformation from a socialist
economy to a market-based one, the Office has been apprehensive in its
230. Interview with Biegunski, supra note 205.
231. The Polish Office had such an experience in connection with its division of the Polish
sugar industry, with resulting firms repeatedly trying to collude since the division. POLAND
OECD REPORT, supra note 109, at 10. In the grain-milling industry, however, demonopolization
proved to be very successful, resulting in several smaller, more versatile enterprises capable of
adapting to changing market considerations. In fact, "[a]fter the initial resistance was overcome,
a real domino effect took place; enterprises of these [sic] branches not slated for division by
AMO came forward on their own with the request to make such a division." POLISH
ANTIMONOPOLY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 25.
232. As Director Leon Biegunski of the Polish Office states, "The sugar industry typifies
the syndrome. It dates back to the 19th century and wants to preserve its traditional structure
and methods." The Polish sugar industry is only producing at 70 percent of its capacity.
Interview with Biegunski, supra note 205.
233. See, e.g., SLOVAK 1991 REPORT, supra note 119, at 16, 26-72 (discussing cases
including the Slovakian Agronakup case regarding a forced tying arrangement in sale contracts
of agricultural products with 41 state enterprises, Slovak Case No. 1340/SPU/1991 regarding
the Administration of Posts and Telecommunications, and Slovak Case No. 102/V 02/1991
regarding a forced tying arrangement in sale contracts of natural oil-based gas); CZECH BULL.,
supra note 113, at 4-5 (discussing the Power Monopolies cases); Polish Antimonopoly Office
(Kszysztof Filinski), Case Report: Centrala Produkt6w Naftowych PP (Center for Oil Industry
State Enterprise v. Local Gas Enterprise) (1992) (unpublished, available from the Polish
Antimonopoly Office); Polish Antimonopoly Office (Zofia Wlodarczyk), Case Report: Polish
Telecom (1992-1993) (unpublished, available from the Polish Antimonopoly Office).
234. Interview with Biegunski, supra note 205.
235. Id.
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approach toward demonopolization. 36 The Polish Office has only recently
begun to apply its power of demonopolization to various industries,237
stating that
in spite of expectations and pressures the Office did not decide to
put into effect a broad, radical deconcentration policy using its legal
authority to do so. The caution of the Office was a result of the
belief that division procedures are very slow by their nature and also
there is a major threat of making a mistake, since it is hard to define
a proper balance between a more competitive structure and possible
loss of advantages of economies of scale and scope.
238
Whether and to what extent other competition authorities will follow the
Polish example and acquire and utilize the power of demonopolization is
still unclear. In any event, all of the competition authorities will continue
to proceed with extreme caution in their efforts toward demonopolization.
C. Harmonization with EC Competition Law
As national economies continue to converge into one universal,
symbiotic world economy, economics and international relations also
begin to merge. On a national level, policy makers become constrained
by internal and external economic considerations. On an international
level, relations become defined within the economic parameters estab-
lished in the trade relations between nations.
Reflecting on this emerging interrelationship between competition law
and international relations, EC Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan had this
to say about the influence of EC competition law on the associated
countries: "We have to provide an example for the fragile democracies
of Eastern Europe. When they look at what binds the twelve member-
States together in a Community, they notice that at the heart of its
successful market economy lies a sound competition policy. '' 239 This
statement captures the essence of the emerging relations between the
associated countries and the EU. By agreeing to develop and adapt their
236. The Czech Ministry is also likely to apply initially its newly-acquired power of
demonopolization with considerable caution. See supra notes 110 and 114.
237. The Polish Office has focused its demonopolization efforts on the agricultural
industry, in particular on the grain milling, seed trading, sugar, and meat processing sectors.
POLAND 1992 REPORT, supra note 54, at 8-9.
238. POLAND OECD REPORT, supra note 109, at 10.
239. Speech of Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan to the EC Chamber of Commerce in New
York on Mar. 26, 1990, extracted in [1990] 4 C.M.L.R. 324, quoted in David P. Fidler,
Competition Law and International Relations, 41 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 563 (1992). For a
discussion of the symbiosis between competition law and international relations, see Fidler,
supra.
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competition laws in conformity with EC competition law, Poland, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary have predetermined the nature
and organization of their national economies. 40
A variety of political and economic motivations drive the associated
countries to join the EU. First, each country would like to return to their
"traditional place" among European nations. 241 Second, each country
would like to achieve the higher standard of living found in the EU,
which sharply contrasts with the standards found in the post-communist
Central European countries. 42 While the first goal is a sound and realistic
expectation on the part of these countries, the second goal may reflect a
misconception about the short-term results of integration, namely, that a
higher standard of living instantaneously and automatically follows
integration.24 3 Nonetheless, in the long-term, these countries will achieve
a higher standard of living through a speedy transition and adjustment to
a market economy, with a heavy emphasis on free trade, competition, and
foreign investment. 2"
With regard to achieving their economic objectives for EU integra-
tion, the associated countries are striving to develop competition regimes
that complement and facilitate the transition from socialism to a market
economy, promote efficiency, and maximize consumer welfare. During
the fragile states of economic development, competition regimes should
provide clear rules, consistent enforcement, and sufficient flexibility in
order to foster economic initiative. Each of these objectives is congruent
with the objectives of EC competition law and harmonization policy. As
Articles 2 and 3 of the Treaty of Rome state:
240. The principal motivation behind the commitments of the East European countries to
harmonize their competition laws is the opportunity for full EU membership; thus it is possible
that these countries, in their eagerness to prove their commitment to the EU, will harmonize
their national laws with EU law to an even greater extent than is found in 'older' EU member
states.
241. As stated by Professor Sachs, "[t]he urge to harmonize with and eventually join the
European Community has deep roots. Poland desires to regain its place in the mainstream of
European society and culture. The slogan of the revolutions of 1989, after all, was 'return to
Europe.' " Sachs, supra note 9, at 34.
242. Lipton & Sachs, supra note 2, at 76.
243. Indeed, in light of global recession and the geographical proximity of the associated
countries to an economically and politically tumultuous East, achievement of Western standards
may take many years.
244. As postulated by Lipton and Sachs in 1991,
[sikeptics often ask whether the austerity cum liberalization program outlined here
can produce stable prices and economic growth. They observe that in Latin America
similar programs have indeed ended inflation, but at the expense of hampered
growth. In the case of Eastern Europe, however, one can identify the primary engine
of growth in the coming years: economic integration with Western Europe.
Lipton & Sachs, supra note 2, at 101-02.
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The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common
market and progressively approximating the economic policies of
Member States, to promote throughout the Community a harmonious
development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced
expansion, an increase in stability, an accelerated raising of the
standard of living and closer relations between the States belonging
to it.245
On a policy level, the harmonization process seeks to enhance
member states' economies by facilitating transnational commercial
transactions and by eliminating unfair competition, restrictive trade
practices, and distortions of competition on a Community-wide scale.246
Because harmonization promotes free and fair competition, it should
alleviate shortages, improve productivity, and thereby enhance both
consumer welfare and the standard of living in the associated countries.247
The associated countries have already begun to introduce these notions
into their competition policies through harmonizing their emerging
national competition laws with EC law.
EC competition law provides additional benefit to the associated
countries because it also seeks to promote small and medium-sized
businesses and to protect consumers.248 In contrast to the enormous enter-
prises established under socialism, 249 small and medium-sized businesses,
generally employing between 50 and 100 individuals, comprise the most
245. EEC TREATY arts. 85-94 and accompanying regulations. The competition policy
embodied in the Treaty of Rome arises from its notions of freedom of establishment and free
movement of goods and services. As Fox and Ordover stated in 1991, "[f]rom the point of view
of nations moving from controlled economies, the most important part of competition policy
will be breaking down government barriers to competition, to the free movement of goods and
services, and to the freedom of business establishment." Fox & Ordover, supra note 3, at 87.
246. Thomas E. Abeltshauser, Towards a European Constitution of the Firm: Problems
and Perspectives, 11 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1235, 1249 (1990). The EC program of harmonization
of commercial law is considered to have "industrial policy functions" in that uniformity in
commercial laws can "considerably facilitate cooperation between companies with different
nationalities and very different board structures." Id. at 1252.
247. For an economic model of the shortage economies of the East European countries,
see Lipton & Sachs, supra note 2.
248. As Professor Fox states, "European jurisprudence has a long tradition of protecting
opportunities for small and middle-size business as well as protecting consumers.., and U.S.
law is quick to declare that any antitrust policy that has regard for the interests of small
business must be protectionist and hurt consumers." Eleanor M. Fox, Merger Control in the
EC: One Year of Enforcement, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 9, 1992, at 5, 7.
249. Under socialism, enterprises often employed several hundred individuals. For
instance, in Poland in 1990, the average state enterprise had 1132 employees. Lipton & Sachs,
supra note 2, at 83. Further, enterprises were extensively geared toward heavy industry and
most of the output produced by one sector of the economy was used as input for another. Such
a system placed a low priority on the consumer and resulted in severe shortages of consumer
goods. Id. at 79.
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productive sector of the post-socialist economies °.2 " Far beyond their
importance in the EU, small- and medium-sized businesses indispensably
help create market-based economies.25' Additionally, they receive special
treatment under the antimonopoly laws of the associated countries.252
Through harmonization of their laws, the associated countries will
inevitably adopt the provisions of EC competition law that accord special
treatment to small- and medium-sized businesses 253 and the policies
embodied in the European Commission decisions under Article 86 that
evidence such special protection. 4 Since the associated countries have
already begun to follow the European tradition, further harmonization
with EU law should only assist the post-socialist economies in their
reform efforts.
V. RECENT AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
TO ANTIMONOPOLY LAWS
Based on four years' experience under the original antimonopoly
laws, each country, with the exception of Slovakia, is working on a set
of amendments to improve their laws and to facilitate the efforts of the
competition authorities toward fulfillment of their roles: the Czech
Ministry is implementing the November 1993 Amendments while the
other competition authorities are formulating new amendments. 5 Each
250. See, e.g., Jane Perlez, Poland's New Entrepreneurs Push the Economy Ahead, N.Y.
TIMES, June 20, 1993, at F7 (describing how 1.5 million private businesses have been registered
in Poland, employing nearly 56% of the Polish workforce and producing nearly 50% of
Poland's GDP, and thus, "[c]ounter to early expectations, the turnaround in Poland ... has
been prompted not by large scale Western investment ... but by medium sized Polish enter-
prises").
251. Id.
252. For example, some special treatments are in the form of de minimis and other
exemptions. Indeed, viewing small and medium sized businesses as vital to growth, the
associated countries are closely following the European tradition through programs designed
to facilitate the establishment and operation of small and medium sized businesses.
253. See, e.g., Regulation No. 418/85, 1986 O.J. (L 53) 5 (research and development block
exemption); Regulation No. 417/85, 1985 O.J. (L 53) 1 (specialization block exemption);
Commission Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance, 1977 O.J. (C 313) 3.
254. While in Poland 10% of state workers were employed in firms with fewer than 100
workers, in Korea 33% of the labor force is employed in establishments with fewer than 100
workers. Lipton & Sachs, supra note 2, at 83-84.
255. The Czech Parliament approved amendments to the Czech Law on November 11,
1993. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. This fall, the Polish Office plans to submit
amendments to the new Polish Parliament formed in Fall 1993, and the Hungarian Office hopes
to submit draft amendments to the new Hungarian government formed following the May 1994
elections.
1172 [Vol. 15:1129
Summer 1994] Competition and Antitrust Law in Central Europe
competition authority is preparing various amendments to emphasize the
goals of privatization, demonopolization, and harmonization.256
A. Privatization
Generally, privatization amendments strive for deeper involvement of
the competition authorities in privatization policy-making and imple-
mentation. For instance, the Polish Office proposes to subject additional
transactions to merger control. Specifically, suggested amendments to the
Polish Law subject the following to merger control: share and asset
acquisitions, interlocking directorates, and transformations of state
enterprises into commercial companies wholly-o ned by the State
Treasury. 257 By expanding merger control to include pre-notification of
share acquisitions, liquidations, and commercializations, the Polish Office
would gain greater control over privatization decisions and capital move-
ments.258 At the same time, the amendments exclude establishment of
companies from merger control, thereby reducing the administrative
burden on the Polish Office that stems from pre-notification of new
private businesses.259
The Czech Ministry is implementing the new merger control provi-
sions of the November 1993 Amendments, which define the term
"merger" to include all forms that "may have negative impact on the
structure of the market," including joint ventures between entities and
"gaining control" over another entity through a share acquisition or inter-
locking directorates. 6 While this new definition of merger is nearly
identical to the definition in the EC Merger Regulation,26' it exempts
speculative acquisitions or acquisitions of shares for the purpose of resale
256. The Hungarian Office has prepared amendments for three principal reasons: first, to
harmonize fully Hungarian competition law with EC law; second, to account for the experience
gained by the Office during the initial three years of applying the Hungarian Law (the Hun-
garian Office heard over 500 cases during this period); and third, to use the advice of foreign
advisers to the Hungarian Office (from the EC and the U.S.). Interview with Sarai, supra note
157.
257. Share and asset acquisitions and interlocking directorates would cease to be expressly
included under the general prohibition against monopolistic practices. POLISH ANTIMONOPOLY
OFFICE, supra note 17, at 15.
258. Interview with Szymanska, supra note 157.
259. Id. Between 1990 and 1993, approximately 1,600,000 new firms were established in
Poland. POLISH ANTIMONOPOLY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 6.
260. While the November 1993 Amendments did not alter the threshold for merger
control, i.e., a 30% market share, in practice the Czech Ministry will assess mergers included
in the new definition on the basis of their impact on 'market structure' and will seek to prevent
'undesirable concentration' of the market through a decline in the number of competitors. Letter
from Bezecny, supra note 216.
261. Council Regulation No. 4064/89 on Merger Control, 1989 O.J. (L 395) 1.
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in order to accommodate the rapidly developing Czech capital markets.262
The new definition does, however, include "transition or transfer of a
company or a substantial part of it," which apparently encompasses
liquidations.263
Finally, the Hungarian Office proposes either to lower the law's thirty
percent market share threshold for merger control or to base the threshold
on joint sales. 264 The Hungarian Office also proposes to introduce manda-
tory pre-acquisition registration in order to facilitate its control over
contemplated transactions.265
As privatization progresses in the associated countries and as the
state-owned portion of the economy is transformed and transferred into
the private sector, the role of the competition authorities in the privatiza-
tion process will diminish. Nonetheless, to the extent that the methods of
privatization determine the nature and structure of the post-privatization
economy, the competition authorities should remain actively engaged in
all stages of the privatization process. To the extent that they are actively
seeking greater involvement in share acquisitions and liquidations, the
competition authorities are exhibiting substantial foresight and will likely
achieve a more competitive post-privatization economy as a result.
B. Demonopolization
As discussed earlier, the Polish Office and the Czech Ministry
currently are the only competition authorities that possess the express
power of demonopolization. The Slovak Office and the Hungarian Office
continue to contemplate such power. However, for political and other
reasons, neither the Slovak Office nor the Hungarian Office currently
proposes to acquire the power of demonopolization, given its potential for
misapplication as well as its potential to confer the type of control that
the post-communist Central European governments are seeking to
avoid.2 6 Instead, these Offices will cautiously observe the Polish Office
and the Czech Ministry as they gain experience in demonopolization.
262. The narrower definition also avoids significant measurement problems connected with
such acquisitions. Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 8(3). The new merger control provisions
also exempt the National Property Fund for a period of one year. Id. at 8a(4).
263. Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 8(l)(b). Unlike the Czech Law, the new Slovak
Law does not include liquidations. Slovak Law, supra note 16, at art. 8(4)(b).
264. Given the rapid and continual transformation of the Hungarian economy, the
Hungarian Office believes that it will be easier for parties to a merger to calculate a level of
joint sales than to calculate a market share percentage. Interview with Sarai, supra note 157.
265. Specifically, the Hungarian Office would introduce registration questionnaires and,
following the approach used in the Netherlands, would only prevent a share acquisition where
it would "harm competition." Interview with Stadler, supra note 157.
266. HUNGARY OECD REPORT, supra note 121, at 14-15.
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C. Harmonization
Indicative of the overall orientation of the competition authorities, the
most extensive amendments contemplated by the authorities are geared
toward harmonization.267 In accordance with EC law, the Polish Office is
proposing block exemptions to its general prohibition against monopolis-
tic practices; the block exemptions are for agreements of minor impor-
tance and for agreements involving production specialization, joint
research and development, cooperative joint ventures, and franchising.268
In addition to harmonizing the merger control provisions of the Polish
Law with EC law, the Polish Office suggests introducing obligatory
notification of all types of mergers, including share and asset acquisitions
exceeding a certain level of ECUs. 269 Finally, the Polish Office would like
to amend the current law to distinguish clearly between vertical and
horizontal agreements, for instance by exempting certain exclusive
purchasing and distribution agreements. °
In accordance with EC law, the Czech Ministry's proposed November
1993 Amendments change the heading "cartel agreements" to
"agreements disturbing economic competition," which clarifies that the
Czech Law applies to both horizontal and vertical agreements. 271 To
distinguish the two types of agreements the Ministry applies a per se type
of approach to horizontal agreements and a rule of reason type of
approach to vertical agreements. 72 In particular, the Ministry explains that
[b]oth the theory and practice of the anti-monopoly efforts shall
without doubt concentrate on banning any agreements between
competing companies (those of a horizontal nature) .... But the ban
267. According to the Polish Office, "the amendments are being prepared in light of the
harmonization process." Interview with Szymanska, supra note 157. According to the Czech
Ministry, the main purpose of the amendments is "connected especially with the removing [of]
all incompatibilities with EC competition law." Letter from Bezecny, supra note 216.
268. POLISH ANTIMONOPOLY OFFICE, INFORMATION ON HARMONIZATION OF POLISH
ANTIMONOPOLY LAW TO THE EEC COMPETITION RULES 3-5 (1992). The advantages of the
block exemptions to Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome include greater certainty for investors
and their advisors, standardization of agreements, and a substantial reduction in the number of
notifications received by the competition authority from individual investors. WHISH, supra note
194, at 262-67.
269. POLISH ANTIMONOPOLY OFFICE, supra note 268, at 3.
270. Id. at 6-8.
271. Some commentators previously criticized the heading "cartel agreements" for
including only agreements between competitors (horizontal agreements). Letter from Ivo
Bezecny, supra note 216, at 4. Nonetheless, other commentators found that although unclear,
when read in its entirety the law implied that vertical agreements were included. Pittman, supra
note 12, at 487-88.
272. Letter from Bezecny, supra note 216, at 5.
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on exclusive dealership rights between manufacturer and distributor
in some cases could limit the access of many new products to a
large number of customers. It is proposed therefore that besides the
possibility of individual exemptions ... to grant the ministry full
powers to permit by decree a block exemption ... for certain types
of agreements as long as they contribute to the improvement or
distribution of the goods, or to the promotion of the technical or
economic progress. The basic condition for such block exemptions
is that they be of mutual benefit to both the manufacturer and the
consumers.
273
In accordance with Article 85(1) of the Treaty of Rome and pursuant
to the November 1993 Amendments, the Czech Law now expressly
protects competition against "restriction, distortion or prevention" 274 and
applies to individuals, legal entities, and trade associations. 275 The
Amendments also broaden the scope of activities covered by the prohi-
bition against anticompetitive agreements to include "decisions by trade
associations," "concerted practices," and "agreements" and "other forms
of mutual understanding" between entrepreneurs. 6
Similar to the Czech November 1993 Amendments, the new Slovak
Law is largely focused on harmonization with EC law. The Slovak Law
expressly protects against the "prevention, restriction or distortion" of
277 278
competition277 and applies to individuals as well as legal entities.
Further, the Slovak Law amends the heading "cartel agreements" to
"agreements restricting competition" 279 and includes "decisions by trade
associations" and "concerted practices" as prohibited anticompetitive
activities.80 In accordance with EC law, the Slovak Law eliminates the
distinction between dominant position and monopolistic position and
redefines "dominant position." Pursuant to the Slovak Law, an entity is
deemed to have a dominant position where the entity does not encounter
substantial competition or where the entity has sufficient economic power
to "behave independently" and "restrict competition. 28'
273. Id.
274. Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. I(I).
275. Czech Law, supra note 16, at arts. 2(a) and 2(b). Formerly, the Czech Law applied
only to 'entrepreneurs.'
276. Czech Law, supra note 16, at art. 2.
277. Slovak Law, supra note 16, at art. 1.
278. Id. at art. 2(1).
279. Id. at art. 3.
280. Id. at art. 3(i).
281. Id. at art. 7(1). This definition closely resembles the definition provided by the
Commission in Case 6/72, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Co., Inc. v.
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Similar to the Czech Ministry and the Slovak Office, the Hungarian
Office is reformulating the general provisions of its law to resemble more
closely EC law. Specifically, the Hungarian Office suggests amending the
law to prohibit all "agreements between competitors, decisions of compet-
itors, decisions of associations of competitors and mutually harmonizing
proceedings,282 which mirrors the language of Article 85(1) of the Treaty
of Rome.283 The Hungarian Office also proposes harmonizing the Hungar-
ian "individual exemption system," under which an agreement is exempt
from the prohibition against anticompetitive agreements if its restriction
on competition "does not exceed the extent necessary" and if the advan-
tages flowing from the agreement outweigh the disadvantages, 284 to
resemble more closely the EC system of block exemptions under Article
85(3) of the Treaty of Rome.285
While the antimonopoly laws of the associated countries are largely
modelled on EC law, the competition authorities are seeking, through
amendments geared toward harmonization, to satisfy the "approximation
of laws" obligation of the Europe Agreements.286 Aside from fulfilling the
provisions of the Europe Agreements, amendments aimed at harmo-
nization with EC law should lead to greater clarity in the antimonopoly
laws of the associated countries.287 This certainly is the case with
amendments that create block exemptions, that distinguish between
horizontal and vertical agreements, and that define more clearly the scope
of the antimonopoly laws. To the extent that such amendments enhance
clarity, they will also improve predictability and certainty for market
participants.
Commission, 1973 E.C.R. 215, [1973] C.M.L.R. D11 (1972).
282. Interview with Sarai, supra note 157.
283. EEC TREATY art. 85.
284. Hungarian Law, supra note 16, at art. 17. See supra notes 45 and 46 and accompany-
ing text.
285. Interview with Sarai, supra note 157.
286. See supra notes 137 and 138 and accompanying text.
287. A further advantage of the harmonization process with the associated countries is to
enhance the EU economy and the economies of its member states by facilitating transnational
commercial transactions and by eliminating unfair competition, restrictive trade practices, and
distortions of free market operations on a Community-wide scale. Abeltshauser, supra note 246,
at 1249. Moreover, as a ready-made model, EC law can provide clear guidance to the East
European post-communist countries, whose peoples "find it excruciatingly difficult to emerge
from the tangle of political and economic collapse, uncertain property rights, and differences
of opinion about the best course for the future." Gerhard Casper, European Convergence, 58
U. CHi. L. REV. 441, 443 (1991).
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CONCLUSION
Although only four years old, the antimonopoly laws of Poland, the
Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary lay the foundation for the
competition regimes of these post-communist Central European states.
The aim of the antimonopoly laws is to create and protect competition in
the newly emerging private sectors and to introduce competition into the
existing state sectors. The competition authorities created under each of
the laws face tasks unparalleled in the West: the creation of a competition
regime capable of facilitating and enduring the transition from a socialist
economy to a market-based one. Through their broad oversight responsi-
bilities, the competition authorities substantially control the economic
reforms underway in each country and simultaneously acquire deep
knowledge about the market and its functioning that is crucial to the
success of the reforms.
Although the antimonopoly laws and competition authorities were
designed and established by each individual country, their nature and
direction have been largely predetermined by the overall goal of each
nation to become a full EU member state. The structure of the laws and
the close cooperation between the competition authorities and the Euro-
pean Commission make it inevitable that the competition regimes of these
countries will increasingly embody the letter and the spirit of EC compe-
tition law and policy.
288
Given the degree of political, social, and economic instability still
being experienced by the post-communist Central European countries,
289
the competition authorities have achieved impressive progress toward
creating and maintaining a competitive environment and toward
demonopolizing the former socialist economy. As the competition
authorities continue to assist these countries in their efforts to create
market-based economies and in their drive to join the EU, they will
achieve stable competition regimes that benefit from the experience of the
West and from their unique experience under socialism.
288. See, e.g., POLAND 1992 REPORT, supra note 54. As one commentator notes with
regard to the East European countries, "[t]he [competition] laws they have enacted are more
advanced than exist in a number of EC member states, one or two of which have no competi-
tion law of substance at all." Michael Reynolds, Anti-Trust Comes to Eastern Europe, INT'L
FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1991, at 11, 12.
289. Frequent strikes, changes in government, refugee problems and calls for lustration are
all prominent features of these fledgling new democracies. See, e.g., Strikes Fomented,
RZECZPOSPOLITA, No. 212, Sept. 9, 1992, at 2, translated in POLISH NEWS BULL., Sept. 9,
1992; Ex-Communists Rebound in Polish Vote, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 20, 1993, at 1;
Citizenship: One of Us or One of Them?, THE ECONOMIST, July 31, 1993, at 31; Slovakia:
Downhill and Out of Control, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 1993, at 50; Hungary: Tea Anybody?,
THE ECONOMIST, June 12, 1993, at 59.
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